University of New Orleans

ScholarWorks@UNO
University of New Orleans Theses and
Dissertations

Dissertations and Theses

8-8-2007

Two Essays Relating to Mutual Fund Performance
Steven J. Welch
University of New Orleans

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td

Recommended Citation
Welch, Steven J., "Two Essays Relating to Mutual Fund Performance" (2007). University of New Orleans
Theses and Dissertations. 590.
https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/590

This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by ScholarWorks@UNO
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is permitted by the
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself.
This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UNO. For more information, please contact scholarworks@uno.edu.

Two Essays Relating to Mutual Fund Performance

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
University of New Orleans
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Financial Economics

By
Steven J. Welch
B.S. California State University East Bay, 1995
M.B.A. California State University East Bay, 1998
M.S. University of New Orleans, 2004
August, 2007

Dedication
This work is dedicated to my loving wife, Yunqing,
and my parents, Jim and Peggy
whose love and support have been integral
to all the successes in my life.

ii

Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I must thank my wife for being a sounding board for my ideas, small
accomplishments, breakthroughs, frustrations and complaints. Also, I would like to acknowledge
the invaluable support of those who traversed the doctoral program at UNO during the same
years as I. Thank yous also go out to my family and friends and in-laws who came to our aid
during Hurricane Katrina and have encouraged me throughout my scholastic career which is
finally coming to an end after about 30 years in school. I would like to offer a special thank you
to Josh and Malinda Umholtz for their friendship and help during the immediate days
surrounding Hurricane Katrina.
Educationally, I would like to thank all of the professors and teachers that I ever
encountered at the University of New Orleans, California State University, East Bay, Perry
Meridian High School, and St. Roch elementary school in Indianapolis, IN. Without them, my
higher education successes would not have been possible.
As far as the content of the dissertation, I would like to thank my dissertation chair,
Peihwang (Philip) Wei for his superb guidance and the rest of my dissertation committee, Tarun
Mukherjee, Arja Turunen-Red, Atsuyuki Naka and Sudha Krishnaswami. Also I would like to
thank Gerald Whitney, Ross Dickens, Hendrik Scholz and participants in seminars at the
University of South Alabama and St. Bonaventure University for helpful comments.
Finally, traversing the maze of paperwork, technical issues, finding out where to go and
with whom to speak for every issue throughout the doctoral program was made much easier with
the help of Dub Lane, the department chair, and Russell Holliday, the department organizational
(administrative) specialist.

iii

Table of Contents
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................................v
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ vi
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... vii
Introduction......................................................................................................................................1
Chapter 1: On the Performance & Tracking Error in Exchange-Traded Funds
and Index Mutual Funds ......................................................................................................4
Introduction..........................................................................................................................4
Background ..........................................................................................................................6
Literature Review...............................................................................................................15
Actively Managed Funds .......................................................................................15
ETFs and Index Funds ...........................................................................................17
Fund Characteristics...............................................................................................19
Tracking Error........................................................................................................23
Analyses and Models .........................................................................................................24
ETF Performance Differences with Index Mutual Funds......................................24
Tracking Error........................................................................................................28
Data ....................................................................................................................................32
Empirical Results ...............................................................................................................33
Conclusion .........................................................................................................................51
References..........................................................................................................................55
Chapter 2: Is Manager Gender Important in the Performance and Characteristics
Mutual Funds? ...................................................................................................................59
Introduction........................................................................................................................59
Literature Review...............................................................................................................62
Gender Differences in Financial Decisions ...........................................................63
Manager Attributes Affecting Mutual Fund Performance.....................................65
Other Factors Affecting Mutual Fund Performance ..............................................66
Mutual Fund Performance Measurement...............................................................71
Other Considerations in Mutual Fund Performance Measurement .......................71
Data ....................................................................................................................................73
Hypotheses and Models .....................................................................................................77
Empirical Results ...............................................................................................................87
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................124
References........................................................................................................................127
Vita...............................................................................................................................................132

iv

List of Tables
Table 1.1. ETF-Index Fund Cost Comparison...............................................................................13
Table 1.2. Wilcoxon Sign-Rank Tests ...........................................................................................34
Table 1.3. Index Fund and ETF Abnormal Return Comparisons (Individual Regressions)..........36
Table 1.4. Index Fund and ETF Abnormal Return Comparisons (Pooled Regressions)...............38
Table 1.5. Alpha Components Correlation Matrix ........................................................................40
Table 1.6. Regressions of Alpha Components...............................................................................43
Table 1.7. Spearman Correlations..................................................................................................46
Table 1.8. Tracking Error...............................................................................................................47
Table 1.9. One- and Two-Period Fund Flows................................................................................49
Table 2.1. Female Domestic Equity Mutual fund Managers .........................................................88
Table 2.2. Male and Female Fund Managers Comparison of Means (Net Assets and Tenure) ....91
Table 2.3. Male and Female Fund Managers Comparison of Means (Standard Deviation and
Tenure)..........................................................................................................................93
Table 2.4. Male and Female Fund Managers Comparison of Means (% Assets in Top 10
Holdings and Tenure) ...................................................................................................95
Table 2.5. T-Test of Equal Means for Individual Regressions on Current Fund Managers..........98
Table 2.6. Gender Significance in Current Mutual Fund Managers............................................100
Table 2.7. Alpha Comparison for Current Managers ..................................................................101
Table 2.8. Dynamic Change in Manager Gender (12-Months Before and After) .......................104
Table 2.9. Dynamic Change in Manager Gender (24-Months Before and After) .......................108
Table 2.10. Alpha Comparison for Change in Manager Gender (12 Months Before and After) 112
Table 2.11. Alpha Comparison for Change in Manager Gender (24 Months Before and After) 117
Table 2.12. Percentage Change in Management Gender Composition .......................................120
Table 2.13. Determinants of Abnormal Return ...........................................................................123

v

List of Figures
Figure 1.1. Total Investment Company Assets..............................................................................10
Figure 1.2. Net Fund Inflows.........................................................................................................12

vi

Abstract
In two unrelated papers, we examine different aspects of mutual fund performance and other
issues. In the first chapter, we look at exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and how they differ from
index funds in performance and tracking error. Using daily data and a more comprehensive
sample than past research, we find abnormal returns associated with the ETFs are higher than the
alphas of the index funds in most cases. The results are much more prevalent in funds that follow
the S&P 500 than funds that do not. When examining the tracking errors, we find index funds are
able to track their indexes much better than ETFs and domestic ETFs are better than ETFs that
track international indexes. In our most significant finding, we find that tracking error affects
fund flow in the following period. While fund flows are generally increasing for both ETFs and
index funds, funds that track their respective index better increase their net assets by a larger
percentage than funds that track their index less well.

In the second chapter, we look at the differences in performance and characteristics of mutual
funds as they relate to the manager’s gender. Using a larger sample and different techniques than
have been used in the past, we find some differences in our matched comparison which suggest
female managers have a lower risk tolerance than males. Females also tend to hold a higher
number of assets (stocks) and fewer assets in their top 10 holdings than do male managers. In,
pooled regressions, we find weak, but significant evidence that current female fund managers,
when analyzed as a group, show slightly lower performance than male managers. We then
analyze performance within funds over time. Our most consistent result is that when changing
the composition of fund management, regardless of gender, the new management has
significantly greater performance than prior management. We also find some evidence, although
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not conclusive, that the percentage of female managers managing a fund is negatively related to
the fund’s performance over time. Finally, we find the determinants of abnormal returns cannot
be attributed to the fund manager’s gender.

Keywords: Exchange-Traded Funds, ETFs, index mutual funds, tracking error, mutual funds,
manager characteristics, gender differences, fund performance

viii

Introduction
In this dissertation, two unrelated topics are examined regarding mutual fund performance. In the
first paper, exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are compared to index mutual funds to see which
performs better and which has lower tracking error relative to the indexes they track. The second
paper makes an attempt to determine and differences between female and male mutual fund
managers and tries to discern whether female or male mutual fund managers have better
performance controlling for many factors.

Exchange-traded funds have become a growing phenomenon in recent years. However, the
literature is sparse on all but the largest ETFs. Specifically, Spiders – the first ETF, and one that
closely mimics the S&P 500 index – a broad market index, is far and away the most studied ETF.
Missing in current literature is a comprehensive study on other ETFs. With several new ETFs
being issued each month, a comprehensive study is long overdue.

Using daily data, we find abnormal returns associated with the ETFs are higher than the alphas
of the index funds in most cases. This result is in contrast to previous results that conclude that
index funds tend to have higher alphas than ETFs. The results are much more prevalent in funds
that follow the S&P 500 than funds that do not. One explanation for the difference in results is
the more comprehensive sample of ETFs analyzed here. We find confirming results that ETFs
have higher abnormal returns than index funds. Other important factors for index funds include
the relative size of a fund when compared with other funds following the same index and the
Herfindahl index (given funds following a single index constitute an industry). For ETFs, the
inception date, expense ratio, standard deviation, and relative size are all important determinants
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of abnormal return. When examining the tracking errors for ETFs and index funds, we find index
funds are able to track their indexes much better than ETFs and domestic ETFs are better than
ETFs that track indexes in other countries. The most significant finding of this paper is that
tracking error affects fund flow in the following period. While fund flows are generally
increasing for both ETFs and index funds, funds that track their respective index better increase
their net assets by a larger percentage than funds that track their index less well.

There has been a large body of literature on the investment behavioral differences of men and
women. Separately, much work has been done in the past decade trying to determine whether
managers add value to the funds that they manage. However, only one prior study, Atkinson et
al. (2003), has specifically examined whether gender might influence the mutual fund manager’s
investment decisions. They use domestic fixed-income funds. This study examines this topic
with a larger sample by using monthly returns from domestic (U.S.) stock mutual funds.

We find some differences in our matched comparison which suggest female managers have a
lower risk tolerance (standard deviation). Females also tend to hold a higher number of assets
(stocks) and fewer assets in their top 10 holdings than do male managers. In our regressions,
when female and male managers’ returns are pooled and compared with each other, we find
weak, but significant evidence that current female fund managers, when analyzed as a group,
show slightly lower performance than male managers. We then analyze performance within
funds over time. Here, the most consistent result is that when changing the composition of fund
management, regardless of gender, the new management has significantly greater performance
than prior management. Although not conclusive, there is some evidence that one would receive
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a larger increase in performance if investing in a fund that is decreasing the percentage of its
female management, although both increasing and decreasing the percentage of female managers
will result in better returns with new management. We also find that the percentage of female
managers managing a fund is negatively related to the fund’s performance over time. Finally, we
find that the determinants of abnormal returns (e.g. expense ratio, net assets, etc.) cannot be
attributed to the gender of the fund managers.

3

Chapter 1: On Performance & Tracking Error in Exchange-Traded
Funds and Index Mutual Funds

1. Introduction
Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and index mutual funds have similar objectives in that
they attempt to closely match some index using a passive management strategy. However, the
way that they are formed is somewhat different. Each one is organized in such a way that they
have distinct cost structures and a slightly differing ability to accurately follow their given
indexes.

Because ETFs and index mutual funds work differently but have similar objectives, it is
interesting to examine the ability of each to match the performance of its index. Past studies
suggest that while ETFs generally underperform their index fund counterparts in the short-term
due to transactions costs, they overcome this shortcoming in the long-term by having slightly
lower management expenses. However, ETFs have been very popular among short-term traders
due to their trading advantages over mutual funds. Since ETFs tend to have relatively short
histories, almost all studies look at a very limited data set – one or two ETFs and one or two
index funds. This study expands on this limitation to look at several types of funds. By using
funds that have not been studied in the past, we provide a more comprehensive idea of how ETFs
and index mutual funds compare as a group rather than only looking at funds that track the S&P
500 or another popular index.

4

Using daily data, we find abnormal returns (alphas) associated with the ETFs are higher
than the alphas of the index funds in most cases. This result directly contradicts results from
previous literature. One explanation for this is that we look at a much larger sample of ETFs than
do prior studies. Higher ETF alphas are much more prevalent in funds that follow the S&P 500
than funds that do not. This finding may be the result of ETF managers improving their
performance by timing their modifications to the fund in order to minimize transactions costs.1

We also look at which components of abnormal return are important determinants. We
find confirming results that ETFs have higher abnormal returns than index funds. Other
important factors for index funds include the relative size of a fund when compared with other
funds following the same index and the Herfindahl index (given funds following a single index
constitute an industry). For ETFs, the inception date, expense ratio, standard deviation, and
relative size are all important determinants of abnormal return.

Another major issue when examining ETFs and index funds is “tracking error.” The
difference between an ETF or index fund’s return and the return of the index that it is following
is defined as its tracking error. Tracking error has several possible causes discussed in the next
section. We examine the tracking error for both ETFs and index funds and compare them to each
other to see which type of fund has less tracking error. Then, we determine if tracking error
affects fund flow in subsequent periods. Our findings show that index funds are able to track
their indexes much better than ETFs and domestic ETFs are better than ETFs that track indexes
in other countries. The most significant finding of this paper is that tracking error affects fund
flow in the following period. While fund flows are generally increasing for both ETFs and index
1

Gastineau (2004) says this method is common among index fund managers.
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funds, funds that track their respective index better increase their net assets by a larger
percentage than funds that track their index less well. This result is important since it suggests
that investors react to tracking errors.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II is a review ETFs and describes
similarities and differences between index funds and ETFs. The third section delves into the
previous literature on the topics analyzed here. The fourth section looks at the specific analyses
and models used in this study. Section V describes the data. The sixth section presents the
empirical evidence, and the final section draws some conclusions.

2. Background
Exchange-Traded Funds have become a phenomenon in recent years. In 1993, the
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) created the first ETF based in the United States, the
Standard & Poor’s Depository Receipts (SPY), or SPDRs or Spiders for short. It was the only
ETF until two years later, when AMEX created the S&P Midcap Depository Receipt (MDY). At
the end of 1995, Spiders were averaging about 300,000 shares traded per day. By April 2007, the
average daily trading volume for Spiders was over 100,000,000 shares per day, more than a 300fold increase in just over 10 years. Further, by April 2007, average daily trading volume for all
ETFs was more than 508,000,000 shares per day.

ETFs have become so popular that they are no longer limited to tracking standard, broadbased indexes such as the S&P 500 that use broad criteria like market capitalization. They now
frequently track very specialized indexes. Some of these indexes focus on specific investment
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styles or market sectors. There are ETFs that follow bond indexes, and others that buy dividendpaying stocks or issues from certain countries or regions. Recently, an ETF was created to track a
socially responsible stock index, and two others now track the price of gold. ETFs are expanding
so quickly that many analysts have predicted that they may take away some of the market share
of index mutual funds.

To get a better understanding of why ETFs have recently become so popular, one must
understand how they work. Exchange-traded funds are similar to index mutual funds. However,
there are important differences. The most obvious to traders is that although ETFs are bundles of
stocks that have net asset values (NAVs) computed similarly to mutual funds, they are traded at
market-determined prices that adjust throughout the day based on supply and demand. Index
fund prices are defined as their NAV which is calculated once per day after the market closes.
Therefore, there are no intra-day price changes on index mutual funds as there are with ETFs.
Due to their ability to trade on the secondary market, ETFs act like closed end funds.

Another important difference is in the way that shares are created and sold. Index fund
shares are created by the fund at the time investors purchase shares of the fund. By contrast,
ETFs issue shares in large blocks called “Creation Units.” Creation Units are then broken up into
individual shares and sold on the secondary market where individual investors usually trade
them. When selling ETFs, investors must either sell them on the secondary market or sell the
Creation Units back to the ETF. When selling the Creation Units back to the ETF, the investor
will normally receive the actual securities that are in the ETF rather than cash. This is called
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“redemption-in-kind.” This feature makes the management fees of ETFs (normally) cheaper than
index funds since the fund has no responsibility for keeping accounting records for the investor.

Exchange-traded funds are registered investment companies just as index funds, closedend funds and other mutual funds. They may be registered as open-ended funds, unit investment
trusts, or set up as grantor trusts. Open-end funds are the most common structure and are similar
to typical mutual funds. The unit investment trust structure is only used by about eight ETFs,
however these include four of the oldest, most liquid funds: Spiders, S&P Midcap, Diamonds
(Dow Jones Industrials) and Cubes (Nasdaq 100 Index). Finally, some exchange-traded funds
have been created as grantor trusts. Unlike the other types of ETFs, these trusts are not registered
with the SEC as investment companies. So, even though they act similarly to ETFs, they are not
strictly ETFs by definition. Also unlike ETFs, they typically do not track a specific index (Scott
and Henrich, 2005). They represent an investor's ownership in common stock of specified
companies in a particular industry, sector or group. Examples of grantor trusts are HOLDRs
issued by Merrill Lynch. Since the data for the indexes is not available for these funds, they will
not be included in the analysis.

Exchange-traded fund assets are very concentrated. As of April 30, 2007, there are 432
equity ETFs. The largest four equity ETFs by total net assets are Standard & Poor’s Depository
Receipts, (SPDR - SPY), iShares MSCI EAFE Index Fund (EFA), iShares S&P 500 (IVV) and
NASDAQ 100 Trust Shares (Cubes - QQQQ). These four ETFs account for 32% of the assets in
all equity ETFs. Further, the ten largest ETFs account for 48% of assets, and the larger half of
ETFs account for 98.4% of all assets in equity ETFs. While highly concentrated, the ETFs are
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much less concentrated than just a few years ago. Poterba and Shoven (2002) reported that in
November of 2001, that the SPDR trust and the NASDAQ 100 trust accounted for nearly threequarters of the total net assets in all ETFs (at that time, there were no non-equity ETFs).

ETF trading is also very concentrated. The three ETFs with the largest average daily
trading volume (three-month average) are Cubes, SPDRs, and iShares Russell 2000 Index
(IWM). These three ETFs account for 54% of the trading volume in all equity ETFs. Further, the
ten largest ETFs account for 74% of trading volume in equity ETFs. In fact, fully one-half of
ETFs account for 99.5% of all equity ETF trading, suggesting that many ETFs are not very
liquid.

U.S.-registered investment companies managed a record $9.5 trillion by the end of 2005.
This constituted about an $900 billion increase from 2004. Mutual funds held $8.9 trillion of this
total, or about 94%. Among other types of investment companies, closed-end fund assets totaled
$276 billion, ETFs surpassed the assets of closed-end funds for the first time and held $296
billion2 and unit investment trust (UITs) assets were $41 billion at the end of 2005 (2006 ICI
Factbook, p. 3). Figure 1 compares total net assets in each type of investment company for
eleven years from 1995 to 2005. Even though it is apparent that mutual funds, closed-end funds
and exchange-traded funds have been increasing in popularity over the entire 10-year period,
only ETFs continued in popularity even in the down market of 2000 – 2002. The most recent
data indicates that, as of April 30, 2007, ETF assets have increased to $455 billion: an increase of
54% in just 16 months!

2

Note: Figures for this paragraph include non-equity as well as equity ETFs. However, as of April 30, 2007, nonequity ETFs account for only 5.3% of assets and 0.6% of trading volume in ETFs.
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Figure 1.1: Total Investment Company Assets
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Another advantage of ETFs can be seen because of the way that they trade. ETFs may be
purchased on margin, sold short, and traded with limit and stop-loss orders, unlike index mutual
funds. This adds to the ETFs’ attractiveness for many purchasers due to the considerable
flexibility in trading. ETFs also are not subject to the uptick rule when being sold short,
presumably because trading in ETFs is like trading an index of stocks rather than a single stock.
Short selling an index is less risky and less likely to cause a panic in any single stock within the
index.

The sheer popularity of ETFs is demonstrated in Figure 2. In this illustration, net fund
inflows are shown for mutual funds and ETFs. The inflows for mutual funds have started to
decline in the past few years as is shown by the 5-year moving average line. In contrast, the
inflows for ETFs have continued to increase every year. The 5-year moving average line for
ETFs only shows a slight hesitation in 2003, but even in that year there was a net increase in
fund inflows into ETFs.

Exchange-traded funds and index mutual funds have expenses that are similar in some
ways and dissimilar in others. This is because of the way each trades. Since exchange-traded
funds are traded in the secondary market, trades are exposed to commissions and bid-ask
spreads. Index funds are primary market instruments and are subject to capital gains taxes and
loads (if applicable). A comparison of costs to both exchange-traded funds and index mutual
funds is shown in Table 1.1.1

1

Kostovetsky (2003) lists most of these in his paper as well.
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Figure 1.2: Net Fund Inflows
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Table 1.1. ETF-Index Fund Cost Comparison
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Two other considerations regarding ETFs are tracking error and market pricing. Tracking
error may be the result of the dividend policy of the ETF. ETFs usually distribute dividends
quarterly, but the stocks that are held in the ETFs distribute dividends throughout the quarter.
This lag can affect the tracking ability of the ETF. Market pricing may also contribute to tracking
error, especially if the ETF trades consistently at a premium or discount from its NAV. While
mutual funds always trade at the NAV, ETF prices are determined by supply and demand in the
market place. Unlike closed-end funds which may trade at rather large discounts (or premiums
theoretically) to their NAVs, ETFs almost always trade in a narrow range around their NAVs.
This is because any large deviation will be arbitraged away quickly by large investors who
purchase (sell) the underlying stocks in the index while simultaneously selling (purchasing) ETF
shares. Another reason for tracking error comes from the timing of a fund in its adjustments
toward index composition changes. For example, when an index, such as the S&P 500
announces that it will add and remove stocks or adjust the weights of the stocks in its portfolio,
index funds tracking that index must also adjust. Some funds will adjust immediately, while
others will wait until the index changes take effect a few days later. This timing differential will
affect the funds tracking ability.

ETFs are often used as investments which provide broad diversification with the purchase
of a single share. But more and more, investors are using ETFs in ways that are more
sophisticated. Hedging has become a popular use of ETFs especially against futures positions
that do not have a very good alternate hedging instrument. Hasbrouck (2003) finds that in the
absence of a futures contract, ETFs provide significant information on price discovery.1 Large

1

Demaine (2002) reviews the advantages of ETFs from the perspective of the sophisticated investor. He observes
specifically, that ETFs greatest value may be in the way that they can substitute for futures when there is no futures
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investors, such as institutions are using ETFs to bet on declines in the market or a particular
industry by short selling them. Often there are options on ETFs which also may be used for
hedging or to speculate on directional shifts in the market or an industry.

3. Literature Review
Surprisingly, literature in the area of exchange-traded funds has not caught the attention
yet of many academic researchers, and therefore, ETFs are not represented strongly in many top
scholarly journals. There are numerous scholarly articles about mutual funds and index funds,
however.

3.1. Actively Managed Funds
In a very early work, Jensen (1968) found that actively managed mutual funds performed
worse than a “buy-the-market-and-hold” strategy even when measuring returns before
management fees were deducted from the actively managed funds. John Bogle (1998)
demonstrated that low-cost funds were directly correlated with high returns on a risk-adjusted
basis. His analysis suggests that passively managed index funds are a better investment than
actively managed funds due to their higher average return and lower cost. Bogle believes that
these factors, combined with their lower risk, make index funds superior to actively managed
funds on a risk-adjusted basis. Frino and Gallagher (2001) come to the same conclusion when
comparing the S&P 500 index funds with actively managed funds.2

contract available for a particular market or industry. He also notes that the liquidity of the ETF itself is not as
important as the liquidity of the market that it tracks, since the basket of stocks in an ETF share derives its value
directly from the stocks that it holds in the underlying market.
2
However, Minor (2001) disagrees to some extent. He claims that actively managed funds can perform better than
index funds. Using the same methodology as Bogle, Minor finds that whether index funds outperform managed
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Gruber (1996) suggests a puzzle that is evident from Bogle’s comments. He proposes the
question, “Why do investors invest in actively managed funds when, on average, they have
performed worse than index funds?” He believes that he has an explanation for this puzzle.
Performance is predictable if it is not priced in mutual funds’ NAVs and management ability
contributes to the performance. Because of this, flows into funds should also be predictable
because some investors are aware of this performance predictability. This implies that investors
investing in some actively managed mutual funds are indeed rational, and therefore solves the
puzzle of why people invest in actively managed funds.

Shukla (2004) also looks at active portfolio management. He attempts to measure the
value of interim portfolio revision to the fund to see if there is value added. He shows that this
active management does not add significantly to portfolio returns. The implication of Shukla’s
results is that shareholders are not receiving any benefit for the fees that they are paying to the
managers of the funds that they hold. He does note that there is a high degree of variability with
his results however, and some managers do add value to the funds that they manage. He also
shows that higher excess returns are associated with higher expense ratios, and claims that this
suggests managers benefit the most from the higher expenses in these funds.

Harper et al. (2006) use ETFs for foreign markets and compare them with foreign closedend funds. They find that ETFs have higher mean returns and higher Sharpe ratios than foreign
closed-end funds, and the foreign closed-end funds have negative alphas. They believe that this

funds depends entirely upon the sample period used for comparison. He finds that in the 5-year period just prior to
the 5-year period that Bogle used, actively managed funds outperformed index funds.
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suggests that the passive investment strategy of the ETFs may be superior to an active strategy
using foreign closed-end funds.

3.2. ETFs and Index Funds
Dellva (2001) performs a simulation exercise with one mutual fund and both ETFs that
follow the S&P 500. He determined that small investors and short-term investors benefited most
by investing in the mutual fund that he chose for his study. While helpful to investors that want
to follow a broad market index, this study was very limited in its scope. Since only one index
was used and three investment vehicles, drawing wide-ranging conclusions based upon study
would be somewhat tenuous. Elton, Gruber, Comer and Li (2002) also studied Spiders and S&P
500 index funds. They find that Spiders underperform the index funds by about 18 basis points
per year. They believe that the ability to trade Spiders throughout the day provides a value that
more than outweighs this small discrepancy in performance. They explain that Spiders are often
used as a risk control mechanism and for short-term trading. Also, even though they may offer
less return than some futures contracts, they have the advantage of being able to trade in much
smaller increments. Poterba and Shoven (2002) examine the differences in returns between the
SPDR trust and the Vanguard Index 500 fund. Both of these securities follow the S&P 500 index
and have the advantage of being the largest ETF and the largest mutual fund. They show that
ETFs perform virtually as well as index funds.

Kostovetsky (2003) shows that under any reasonable circumstances, a small investor
would prefer an index mutual fund over the corresponding ETF. Also, larger investors normally
will benefit from investing in ETFs, especially if their holding period is of sufficient length. The
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“sufficient length” depends upon the amount invested. The more invested, the shorter the length
of time for the benefits of ETFs to outweigh the costs.

Gastineau (2004) looks at the question of why ETFs underperform index funds that track
the same index. His focus is the operational efficiency of the funds’ management. By inspecting
the historical returns (through 2002) of iShares, Spiders, and Vanguard indexes following the
S&P 500 and the Russell 2000, he notes that the ETFs typically underperform their respective
index funds. He conjectures that a significant portion of the underperformance is likely due to the
failure of ETF fund managers to reduce their transactions costs in a way that is common among
index fund managers. When indexes change their composition and/or weighting, the index fund
manager will time his modifications to the fund in order to minimize transactions costs. He also
notes that although there are no legal barriers against this timing in ETFs, ETF managers have
not yet adopted this method of cost reduction. The explanation for the ETF underperformance
Gastineau posits seems reasonable, but since there is no analytical methodology incorporated in
his paper, a broader, academic study is clearly needed to determine if his argument has merit. We
look at a broader range of ETFs and a more current data set to see if the underperformance holds
for the broader range of ETFs or just the small subset used by Gastineau.

In an early work on ETFs, Olienyk et al. (1999) find short-term causal relationships
between the ETFs, suggesting arbitrage and opportunities market inefficiencies. Demaine (2002)
points out that sector-based ETFs were inevitable, especially in Europe. This is because recent
trends have indicated that country-based correlations are increasing, making diversification by
country less meaningful in Europe since the introduction of the European Union (Eurozone).
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However, the industry-based correlations have been declining at the same time, making sectorbased investing more attractive. Engle and Sarkar (2002) conclude that domestic ETFs are
normally priced very close to their market value. They have less confidence when considering
international funds which are less actively traded and therefore less precisely priced. However,
they surmise that since these ETFs operate in a more stringent environment, they may still be
close to correctly priced. On the other hand, Madura and Ritchie (2004) find a strong
overreaction in ETFs during the 1998 – 2002 period when technology issues appear to have been
over-priced. They found greater overreaction in ETFs that were more volatile and in international
ETFs.3 Jares and Lavin (2004) find that the daily returns of Asian (specifically Japan and Hong
Kong) iShares are well correlated with daily S&P 500 returns. These ETFs show significant
power when trying to predict movements in the respective country stock markets. Jares and
Lavin (2004) also show that profitable trading strategies may be implemented that take
advantage of Asian iShares’ overprediction of next day returns to NAV. This line of literature
suggests that there is a fundamental difference between domestic and international ETFs and
index funds. Therefore, it may be useful to account for this difference in our analysis.

3.3. Fund Characteristics
Mutual fund and ETF performance can be shown to be influenced by several fund
characteristics. Characteristics that have been shown in previous literature to influence returns
for ETFs and index mutual funds are expense ratio, size (total net assets), risk (standard
deviation), turnover, and fund flow. For this study, size is not considered a factor for the analyses

3

Also, using European iShares, Simon and Sternberg (2005) find significant overreaction to after hours
developments. So much so that one can derive a profitable trading strategy based upon buying or shorting iShares at
the close of U.S. trading, if the discount or premium to NAV is sufficiently large.
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that compare funds with indexes since indexes themselves are not tradable, and therefore, have
no net asset value with which to compare.

The literature surrounding the importance of expense ratios on mutual fund performance
shows a consensus that mutual fund expense ratios matter when determining their performance.
This is probably the only factor that is almost universally agreed upon to affect fund
performance. For example, Malhotra and McLeod (1997) shows that funds with lower
management fees and expenses increase returns.4 Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996) not only
establishes that low expense funds outperform high expense funds, but that this observation
holds even when comparing load funds with low expenses with no-load funds with high annual
expenses.5 Grinblatt and Titman (1993) and Carhart (1997) show that mutual fund returns are
affected most directly by expenses and transaction costs. They determine that expenses have a
negative impact on performance that is at least proportionate to the level of the expense ratio.
This is consistent with Shula (2004) who shows that returns achieved by actively managed funds
are not significant enough to compensate for the increase in expense ratio. Fabozzi et al. (1991)
conclude that any improved ability demonstrated by managers in forecasting fund performance is
negated by operating expenses and transaction costs. This suggests that an investor who does not
have the ability to do the extensive research to find the best fund managers can simply look for
funds with low expenses to receive returns that are comparable. Dellva and Olson (1998) concur
with this assessment by stating that funds with superior performance tend to have lower expense
ratios.

4
5

Walker (1997) confirms this result.
Hooks (1996) confirms this conclusion.
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There is one study that shows that higher expense ratios have a purpose. Droms and
Walker (1995) show that expense ratios are not predictive of fund performance by demonstrating
that the funds that have higher returns typically take greater risks and have higher expense ratios.
Grinblatt and Titman (1994) have an explanation for this result. They hypothesize that funds that
do more research and trade the most may be exposing stocks that are underpriced. Golec (1996)
suggests that higher expense ratios may be a signal that management has superior investment
skills. The implication is that these skills should lead to greater fund performance. However, as
shown in literature, the empirical evidence shows that higher expense ratios do not lead to
greater performance.

The effect of fund size is a bit unclear. Droms and Walker (1995) show that smaller funds
outperform larger funds, on average. They also find that these smaller funds invest in riskier
assets, so it is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the improved performance is due to the size or
the risk.6 Grinblatt and Titman (1994) present evidence that mutual fund size and performance
are unrelated. They explain that it is not possible to attain superior performance by investing in a
fund based upon its total net assets. Curcio et al. (2003) find that for mutual funds, firm size has
a positive and significant relationship, and book-to-market has a negative and significant
relationship to fund returns. This is contradictory evidence to the efficient markets hypothesis
proposed by Fama and French (1992) and supported by much asset pricing literature. Curcio et
al. show that for out-of-sample mutual fund data, the Fama/French factors are not consistent at
explaining returns.

6

Several studies, including those by Malhotra and Mcleod (1997) and Markese (2000) show that larger funds
typically produce higher returns. Of course, there are also studies that show that fund size is not a determining factor
at all in mutual fund performance.
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According to both theory and empirical evidence from noted researchers like Fama and
Macbeth (1973) and Fama and French (1992), more risk provides higher expected returns.7
Droms and Walker (1995) use the standard deviation of annual total returns for equity funds to
proxy for risk. They show that risk is the most highly correlated determining factor in equity
mutual fund performance.8

The turnover ratio of a mutual fund is usually computed by taking a fund’s purchases or
sales and dividing by the fund’s average total net assets. A lower number implies a buy-and-hold
strategy by the fund and usually means lower trading costs which should translate into a higher
return. Also, the high turnover ratios usually result in higher expenses and lower performance
due to transactions costs. Malhotra and McLeod (1997) show that lower turnover is associated
with greater fund performance. This is in contrast to the results achieved by Droms and Walker
(1995), who find turnover is unable to predict increased performance over any specified period.
Droms and Walker’s result may have been a product of the way they sorted their database,
though. They parceled out 10 portfolios based upon the standard deviation of the mean return
rather than by fund objective, the more common method of creating mutual fund portfolios. It
seems more likely that funds with aggressive objectives may have significantly different turnover
ratios than funds with more conservative objectives, for example.

Sirri and Tufano (1998) study the flow of funds into and out of mutual funds. They find
that search costs are a significant factor in determining fund flows. The fund flows are related to
the media attention that the funds are getting and the size of the family of funds, factors which
7

More recently, Markese (1999) comes to the same conclusion.
Barber (1994) also uses historical standard deviation (of monthly mutual fund returns) to measure unsystematic
mutual fund risk.
8
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both can lower search costs for individual investors. They also find that investors seem to favor
funds that have been doing well in the recent past, and that funds with high marketing costs have
a stronger relationship between performance and flow of funds.

3.4. Tracking Error
Several authors look at improving (reducing) tracking error through active trading
strategies. Jorion (2003) and El-Hassan and Kofman (2003) look at active portfolio allocation
strategies that exploit the predictability in the conditional variance-covariance matrix of asset
returns by deriving a constrained tracking-error efficient frontier.9 Then, they use the variancecovariance matrix to rebalance their portfolios to minimize tracking error. In theory, these
techniques seem efficient in reducing tracking error. However, in practice, since trades are made
dynamically, implementing the strategies would seriously increase the trading volume and
turnover ratio in a mutual fund portfolio, thereby increasing trading costs substantially.

Frino and Gallagher (2001) empirically study index fund tracking error. They explain that
the primary factor that causes index fund tracking error is the cost of transactions which includes
liquidity concerns, fund cash flows, dividends, volatility of the benchmark, corporate activity,
and index composition changes. They find that the tracking error associated with the S&P 500
index funds follows a quarterly (seasonal) pattern. The tracking error is lowest at the end of each
calendar quarter. They surmise that this seasonal effect may be the result of the timing of

9

Burmeister et al. (2005) develop diagnostic tools to evaluate alternative active trading strategies for reducing
tracking error.
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dividend payments by the funds. Other reasons for tracking error, they conclude, may have to do
with the changes in the index itself.10

4. Analyses and Models
The analyses and models are grouped such that the first set deals directly with
performance differences between ETFs and index mutual funds and reasons for these
differences. The second section of analyses addresses the important issue of tracking error.

4.1. ETF Performance Differences with Index Mutual Funds
Analysis 1: Comparing abnormal returns of exchange-traded funds and mutual funds.
Although they do not specifically compare abnormal returns, Poterba and Shoven (2002)
compare total returns of Spiders and the Vanguard Index 500. They show that the Vanguard
index mutual fund performed slightly better during the period from 1994 to 2000. Also, Dellva
(2001) compares these two funds with the iShares S&P 500 to test which is the best investment.
He includes expenses, management fees, and tax considerations in determining his results over
one to 15-year time horizons. He concludes that ETFs have advantages over longer holding
periods and when larger lump-sum investments are made. Neither study does any kind of
regression analysis. Both of these comparisons demonstrate a need for further examination on the
topic.

To test whether or not ETFs and index mutual funds have insignificantly different
abnormal returns, first, we test whether the difference between ETF returns and index fund
10

Agapova (2006) also examines tracking error by comparing the tracking error of several ETFs and index mutual
funds relative to their indexes. She concludes that ETFs have smaller tracking errors and lower expenses.
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returns is significantly different using individual comparison tests. We perform KolmogorovSmirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests to examine the data for a normal distribution. Since essentially
none of the indexes are normally distributed, we run the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank
Test on each pair in the data. We test all combinations of index funds and ETFs that follow the
same index. If we find a significant result for this test, it will tell us that the pair of funds (or an
index and a fund) being tested have different median returns.

The second test of abnormal returns we use is to run OLS regressions of the ETF and
index fund returns against the returns of the index that each is tracking. The only independent
variable in these equations is the index that the fund is tracking.

ETFRet t = α ETF + β ETF INDEX t + ε ETF

(1)

IFRet t = α IFUND + β IFUND INDEX t + ε IFUND

(2)

To determine whether the ETF and index fund abnormal returns are significantly
different from each other, we then simultaneously run two regressions at a time using a
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model and subtract the ETF alpha from the index fund
alpha to test whether there are significant differences in the abnormal returns of the paired
equations. This test was done for each pair of ETFs and index funds that follow the same index.
If we find a significantly positive result, then we can say for that pair of funds, the index fund
performs better than the ETF.
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We then perform a third test, a panel regression on all index funds and ETFs, to see
whether ETF returns are significantly different from index fund returns:

Return p ,t = α + β INDEX p ,t + χ ETF p + ε p ,t

(3)

where ETF is a dummy variable that does not vary with time. ETF is equal to one if the fund is
an ETF and zero if an index fund. If the dummy coefficient,

χ

, is significant, then, as a group,

index funds and ETFs have significantly different abnormal returns.

Equation (1) also shows something interesting when comparing ETFs that track the same
index. There are two cases (shown below) where different ETFs track the same index:

ETF
SPY (SPDRs - Spiders)
iShares S&P 500 Index (IVV)
MDY (MidCap Spiders)
iShares S&P MidCap 400 Index (IJH)

INDEX TRACKED
S&P 500
S&P 500
S&P Midcap 400
S&P Midcap 400

ETF ORGANIZATION
.
Unit Investment Trust
Open-End Investment Company
Unit Investment Trust
Open-End Investment Company

Analysis 2: Testing ETFs that track the same index.
The Standard & Poor’s ETFs were set up as unit investment trusts and are larger and
more popular (more trading volume) than the ones set up as open-end investment companies
(mutual funds). The S&P ETFs are also at least five years older, and therefore, more established
than the iShares funds which have only been available since May 2000. Again, to test the
abnormal returns, we run OLS regressions of the respective ETF returns against the returns of the
index each is tracking. To determine whether the ETF and index fund abnormal returns are
significantly different from each other, we again simultaneously run regressions with the SUR
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model and test whether there are significant differences in the alpha terms in the paired
equations. If there is a significant difference, it will tell us which ETF outperforms the other.

Analysis 3: Determinants of abnormal returns in ETFs and index funds.
To investigate the determinants of the portfolio’s alpha, we run the following regression
on alpha to determine if these factors are important in determining the abnormal returns of index
funds and ETFs:

αˆ = C + ∑ γ V + ω D + ∑ λ V D + η
n

i

i

n

i, j

i, j

i

j =1

where

i

i, j

i, j

i

(4)

i

j =1

α̂ is the alpha on the portfolio as determined in equations (1) and (2), C is a linear

constant,
below),

γ is a slope coefficient, V are the variables related to the fund from j = 1 to n (see

ω

is an adjustment for the constant term given the fund is an ETF, D is a dummy that

is equal to one if the fund is an ETF and zero if the fund is an index mutual fund, and

λ is a

slope adjustment given the fund is an ETF. Some of the variables (V) used are inception date,
expense ratio, size (total net assets), portfolio risk (standard deviation), turnover ratio, and
whether the fund is a no-load fund. Most index funds are no-load funds, so the no-load variable
is introduced as a dummy to capture the few index funds that are not no-load. These variables are
used because they have been shown in prior literature to affect abnormal returns of mutual funds.

We also use a dummy signifying whether the index fund is a true index fund or not and
the relative size (by net assets) of the fund to all funds following the same index. True index
funds are defined here to be the index funds that attempt to track the given index by maintaining
positions in the assets within the index and trying to replicate the performance of the portfolio on
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a nearly one-to-one basis. In other words, the relative beta should be very close to one to be
considered a true index fund. Index funds that follow an index, but actively target a beta of 2.0
would not be considered a true index fund, for example; nor would a fund that sells the index
portfolio short, effectively targeting a beta of –1.0. There are twenty such index funds in our
sample. We list them separately as “other index funds.” ETFs are all considered true index funds.
Relative size is tested to see if fund level market concentration is a factor in determining
abnormal returns. All factors described thus far are fund-related and as such, the managers of the
funds may have some control over them. If the coefficients on (for example) expense ratio and
turnover are negative and significant, then they inversely impact abnormal returns.11 In this case,
the manager would want to minimize expenses and turnover to allow the fund to achieve the
highest possible return for investors.

We also introduce two index-specific variables are used that do not change from fund to
fund. They are the number of funds following an index, and the Herfindahl index using the
assumption that all funds following the same index constitute an industry. These are introduced
to see if the concentration of the industry (funds following an index) has an effect on abnormal
returns. We assume that the fund manager has no control over this factor.

4.2. Tracking Error
Many studies examining ETFs and index funds make a point of determining each fund’s
tracking error. When reading the literature, one might wonder why investors would care about
tracking error. One reason to look at tracking error is because investors use ETFs to change

11

Commissions are not included because they typically are fixed and mainly vary by broker rather than strictly by
shares or dollars transacted.
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equity positions quickly. For example, hedge funds use ETFs frequently. Tracking errors are also
important to arbitrageurs, who could profit from misalignment of fund prices and the underlying
index. By observing ETFs, we may be able to gauge what hedge funds are doing in a real time
basis. If ETFs show a poor tracking ability, they would be less useful for hedge funds. Therefore,
we analyze ETFs and index funds to compare their abilities to track the indexes they follow.

Analysis 4: Comparison of ETF and index mutual fund tracking errors.
When analyzing the tracking error of ETFs and index funds, we look at the funds in a
manner similar to that used by Frino and Gallagher (2001). Using 42 index funds that track the
S&P 500, Frino and Gallagher calculate tracking error (TE) in three ways. We will use the same
notation they use.

In the first method, we derive tracking error by using the absolute value of the difference
in returns of the ETF or index fund and the benchmark index (ept = Rpt – Rbt), starting on day t,
where the daily average absolute tracking error over n days (TE1,p) is:
n

TE1, p =

∑e
t =1

pt

n

(5)

A second test for tracking error compares the variability (standard deviation) of the
difference in the ETF or index portfolio returns and the underlying index return (TE2,p). This
method may be calculated as:

TE 2, p

1 n
(e pt − e p )2
=
∑
n − 1 t =1
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(6)

The third method used for tracking error is to estimate the standard error of the residuals
of a regression on returns (TE3,p). The model is simply the same as models (1) and (2). This
method is useful because when regressing the return of the ETF or index portfolio on the return
of the underlying index, the standard error of the regression equation provides a general estimate
of tracking error. Pope and Yadav (1994) explain, however, that if the beta of this regression is
not exactly equal to one, the regression residuals will be biased, and therefore, differ from TE2,p.
These authors show that due to negative serial correlation, tracking error will be overstated if the
portfolio does not have a beta of exactly 1.0 against the benchmark portfolio. Negative serial
correlation is especially a problem when using higher frequency data such as daily or weekly
returns. However, the emphasis of this study is the difference in the tracking errors between the
two types of fund. So, since there is no evidence that these measurement problems are more
serious for one type of fund, we do not expect that the negative serial correlation will lead to
biased conclusions.

Hypothesis: Tracking error has an inverse relationship with fund flows
After calculating tracking error, we regressed lagged tracking errors on fund flows of
ETFs and index funds to determine if the tracking error affects fund flows. The purpose of this
test is to gauge the importance of tracking errors to investors. If investors view tracking errors as
important for trading, they will move money in and out these funds based upon tracking errors.

FFt , p = ψ t , p + κ t , pTE

n
t −s , p

where

FFt

3

3

i =1

i =1

+ ∑τ i ,t , pδ i + ∑θ i ,t , pδ iTEtn−s, p

is fund flow at time t; ψ , κ , τ and

θ

are parameters;

(7)

TE is the tracking error

variable at time t–s, where s = 1, 2; and n is the superscript denoting each method of calculating
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tracking error. There are three dummy variables for this regression.
one if the fund is an ETF and zero if an index fund;

δ2

δ1 is a dummy that equals

is a dummy that equals one if the fund is

an international fund and zero if it is not an international fund; and,

δ3

is a dummy that equals

one if the fund is a true index fund and zero if it is not a true index fund. We use the second
dummy because there is some evidence that international funds are less liquid and less well
priced (Engle and Sarkar, 2002). Therefore, the tracking errors of international funds are higher
than domestic funds. The third dummy is used because of the large differences found in index
funds that do not track their indexes targeting a beta of 1.0. We look at one and two lagged
periods for tracking error to see if past tracking error affects fund flows further away in time. If

κp

is significant, then past tracking error affects current fund flows. Our a priori expectation is

that

κp

will be negative and significant, which means if tracking error is large, fund flows will

decrease by more than if tracking error is small. Since fund flow is significantly impacted by
hedging and arbitraging activities, the significance of

κ

also would indirectly suggest that

tracking error is important to participants in these activities. The

κp

obtained from the differing

tracking error methods should be very similar. We also expect the intercept term, ψ t , p , to be
positive and significant implying the flow of funds is typically positive into both ETFs and index
mutual funds. Also given the popularity of ETFs, they are generally growing at a faster pace.12
So, the intercept may be greater for ETFs than for mutual funds.

12

Agapova (2006) finds that flows into ETFs were positive and substantially higher than flows into index mutual
funds.
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5. Data

The data in this paper come from various sources. General ETF data except for prices and
returns come from “Mutual Funds: The Individual Investor’s Guide to Exchange-Traded Funds
2005” which is an annual article in the trade journal sponsored by The American Association of
Individual Investors. ETF daily prices, returns and other supplemental ETF data are from Yahoo
Finance.

Index mutual fund data except for prices and returns come from Morningstar Principia
Advanced Mutual Funds Module dated February 29, 2004. From this CD, we obtained all of the
data for the index fund characteristics such as net asset value (size), turnover and expense ratio.
Daily index fund prices and returns are from Yahoo Finance.

Calvert, Morningstar Indexes, Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), and Yahoo
Finance provided index values. Funds less than two years old on June 30, 2006 are excluded
from the data set because two years is the minimum amount of data required to determine the
annual fund flows. As much as possible, ETFs are matched with index funds following the same
index. Fund flow data are annual and are obtained directly from fund prospectuses.

The final data set includes 177 index funds and 72 ETFs that follow 78 indexes. Of these,
there are 25 indexes that have at least one index fund and one ETF that follow it (several have
multiple index funds following the index). A total of 27 funds, two index funds and 25 ETFs, are
international funds, and 20 index funds were not classified as “true index funds.”
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6. Empircal Results

In order to determine whether parametric or nonparametric tests were appropriate for our
paired comparison tests, we first perform Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests to
determine whether each (or any) of the indexes follow a normal distribution. In seven out of the
78 indexes, a normal distribution could not be ruled out. All indexes for which we were unable to
rule out a normal distribution have existed for less than three years.

Because the indexes do not follow a normal distribution, a paired t-test to determine
whether index funds and ETFs have similar distributions to their respective indexes is not
entirely appropriate. Therefore we performed a nonparametric test, the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks
Test, on the daily returns for each of the following pair-types following the same index:
index/index fund, index/ETF and index fund/ETF. A test with a significant p-value indicates the
differences in the median returns of the pairs are significantly different. In other words, the
index, index fund or ETF does a poor job of reproducing the same median return as its
counterpart.

Looking at the Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test results in Table 1.2, it is apparent that a
large number of index funds do not produce the same median return as their indexes (58% of the
funds had significant p-values at the 10% level or lower). We also note that of the 102
statistically significant comparisons, the index outperforms the index fund 87% of the time. This
result is expected since expenses reduce the funds’ returns. However, when examining the other
three panels, we find only a small number of other pair-types do a poor job of reproducing the
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Table 1.2. Wilcoxon Sign-Rank Tests
Panel A. Index to Index Fund
n = 177
P-level
Significance Frequency
1%
78
5%
11
10%
13

Percent
44.07%
6.21%
7.34%

Cumulative
Frequency
78
89
102

Cumulative
Percent
44.07%
50.28%
57.63%

Percent
0.00%
2.78%
4.17%

Cumulative
Frequency
0
2
5

Cumulative
Percent
0.00%
2.78%
6.94%

Panel C. ETF to Index Fund (Following same index)
n = 256
P-level
Cumulative
Percent
Significance Frequency
Frequency
1%
1
0.39%
1
5%
2
0.78%
3
10%
1
0.39%
4

Cumulative
Percent
0.39%
1.17%
1.56%

Panel D. ETF to ETF (Following same index)
n=2
P-level
Cumulative
Percent
Significance Frequency
Frequency
1%
0
0.00%
0
5%
0
0.00%
0
10%
0
0.00%
0

Cumulative
Percent
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

Panel B. Index to ETF
n = 72
P-level
Significance Frequency
1%
0
5%
2
10%
3

We perform a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test on 507 combinations of indexes, index funds,
and ETFs. Each panel above illustrates a specific pair-type. The column "Frequency"
illustrates the number of tests of that pair-type that fall between the specified
significance levels (i.e. for Panel A, 11 pairs have significance levels (p-values) falling
between 1% and 5%).
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returns of their paired asset. We expected ETF-index fund and ETF-ETF pair-types to match
fairly closely because both ETFs and index funds have both been shown to underperform their
benchmarks1 so ETFs and index funds should (or at least could) have very similar median
returns, but continue to underperform relative to the index. However, the most unexpected result
from this test is the Index-ETF test comparisons. These test results suggest ETFs do produce the
same median returns as their indexes. Only 7% of these comparisons are significant at the 10%
level or below and none is significant at the 1% level.

We summarize the results from the individual OLS regressions on index funds and ETFs
in Table 1.3. We find that the alphas (abnormal returns) are very small using our daily data.
There are 256 index-fund-ETF pairs in our sample that each follow the same index. Descriptive
results from the regressions are shown in Panel A. The range of differences in alphas is between
+0.0321% and –0.0245% per day. Only nine of the 256 pairs have differences in alphas which
are statistically significant. These are individually listed in Panel B of the table. Even though the
results were generally insignificant, there some results from these regressions that are
noteworthy. First, out of the 256 comparisons, the abnormal returns associated with the ETFs are
higher than the alphas of the index funds in 214 cases, which represents 83.6% of all cases. This
result is in contrast to previous results that conclude that index funds tend to have higher alphas
than ETFs. This result may be due to ETF managers reducing their costs by timing their
modifications to the fund in order to minimize transactions costs, especially in funds that follow
the S&P 500. The results are much more prevalent in funds that follow the S&P 500 than funds
that do not. About 86% of S&P 500 funds have higher performing ETFs, while only about 30%

1

See Elton, Gruber and Busse (2004) for index funds; Gastineau (2004) and Engle and Sarkar (2002) for ETFs.
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Table 1.3. Index Fund and ETF Abnormal Return Comparisons (Individual Regressions)
Panel A.
Statistic
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Standard Dev.

Alpha (E)
0.0054%
0.0061%
0.0242%
-0.0037%
3.164E-05

Alpha (I)
0.0023%
0.0033%
0.0367%
-0.0250%
6.785E-05

Alpha (I) - P-Value for
Alpha (E) Difference
-0.0031%
0.0000
-0.0023%
0.0321%
-0.0245%
6.528E-05

Panel B.
Index
True
Alpha (I) Index
ETF Alpha (E)
Fund
Index = 1
Alpha (I)
Alpha (E)
p-value
DJIA
DIA
9.23E-05 RYCVX
0
-4.57E-05
-1.38E-04 0.01864
DJIA
DIA
7.89E-05 PDOWX
0
-5.35E-05
-1.32E-04 0.02317
S&P 500 IVV
6.63E-05 VADBX
1
0.0003668
3.01E-04 0.00417
S&P 500 IVV
6.63E-05 ULPIX
0
-9.81E-05
-1.64E-04 0.00795
S&P 500 IVV
6.42E-05 RYTNX
0
-0.0001349
-1.99E-04 0.01699
S&P 500 IVV
6.63E-05 BLPIX
1
-4.98E-05
-1.16E-04 0.05472
S&P 500 SPY
6.22E-05 ULPIX
0
-0.0001464
-2.09E-04 0.00169
S&P 500 SPY
6.25E-05 RYTNX
0
-0.0001349
-1.97E-04 0.02918
S&P 500 SPY
5.97E-05 BLPIX
1
-5.95E-05
-1.19E-04 0.06461
256 ETF-Index Fund pairs were regressed using ETFRet t = α ETF + β ETF INDEX t + ε ETF or
IFRett = α IFUND + β IFUND INDEX t + ε IFUND then the alphas were compared using a SUR analysis.
Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for these comparisons. Alpha (E) is the abnormal return on
the ETF, and Alpha (I) is the abnormal return for the index fund. The fourth column shows the
descriptives of the differences between the abnormal returns on the index fund and ETF. Panel B
shows all nine pairs that have a significant difference.
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of ETFs that follow other indexes outperform their index fund counterparts. This result is not
altogether unexpected since S&P 500 funds are generally more scrutinized than other funds.
Another result of note from this table is that of the nine significant results, only three indexes
were involved and most of the significant results were between ETFs and index funds that were
not classified as “true” index funds. Overall, this table suggests that individually, index funds
typically do not significantly differ in performance with their ETF counterparts. However, as a
group, the mean abnormal return for ETFs is statistically significantly higher than that of index
funds.

After analyzing the individual regressions in Table 1.3, Table 1.4 shows the results of the
pooled regressions. All returns from index funds and ETFs were pooled along with their
respective indexes. A dummy was added to the equation to extract the differences between index
funds and ETFs as shown in equation (3). The results show that when all returns are regressed
against their respective index returns, the ETF dummy is weakly significant. So, to delve into the
reason for the significant results, we included three more regressions. When international funds
are removed, the significance disappears, but when only true index funds and ETFs are
regressed, the ETF dummy increases its significance. As mentioned earlier, true funds are ones
that attempt to track the given index by maintaining positions in the assets within the index and
trying to replicate the performance of the portfolio on a one-to-one basis. All ETFs fall into this
category, as do all but 20 index funds. In the last regression in this table, when both international
funds and non-true index funds are excluded, the ETF dummy is no longer significant.
Essentially, this table is confirming results from the previous table, the index funds that were
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Table 1.4. Index Fund and ETF Abnormal Return Comparisons (Pooled Regressions)

Variable
Alpha
Return on Index
ETF Dummy

All Funds
6.91E-05 ***

True Funds
5.68E-05 ***

1.86E-05

1.86E-05

1.10E-05

0.80296 ***

0.80013 ***

0.89984 ***

1.32E-03

1.38E-03

7.88E-04

7.29E-05 *
4.06E-05

Adjusted R-Squared

Domestic Funds
6.91E-05 ***

0.48659

1.79E-05
4.89E-05

0.48267

4.63E-05 **
2.30E-05

0.78364

Domestic &
True Funds
5.40E-05 ***
9.70E-06

0.9078 ***
7.34E-04

1.97E-06
2.44E-05

0.82324

Pooled regressions were performed on all index funds and ETFs using the equation, Return p , t = α + INDEX p , t β + ETFp + ε p , t . The
first regression shows the results of all 249 index funds and ETFs. The other regressions apply the same equation but remove the 27
international funds in the second regression, remove the 20 funds that are not classified as true index funds in the third regression, and
remove both the international funds and the funds that are not classified as true index funds in the last regression. Standard errors are
below the coefficients. *, **, *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively.
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categorized as not being true index funds seem to be driving the differences between ETFs and
index funds. So, index funds which target an exact replication of their index’s performance do
not significantly differ in performance with their ETF counterparts. It is also noteworthy that the
ETF dummy is always positive, again confirming the findings in the previous table.

Next, we look at the elements that may affect the abnormal returns. The factors that we
include as possible determinants are inception date, expense ratio, net assets, standard deviation,
turnover, and whether or not the fund is a no load fund. These variables are used because they
have been shown in prior literature to affect abnormal returns of mutual funds. We also include
as possible factors that influence abnormal returns are whether the fund is a true index fund
(dummy), and the relative size of the fund when compared to all funds following the same index.
For this variable, if a fund is the only fund following a given index, its relative size under this
measure would be 100%. We also use two index-specific variables that do not change from fund
to fund. First is the number of funds following an index, and the second is the Herfindahl index
using the assumption that all funds following the same index constitute an industry. If only one
fund follows a given index, its Herfindahl index would be 10,000. We include these factors to
see if fund-level or industry-level concentration is important in determining the abnormal return
of the funds.

Some variables are relatively highly correlated with other variables. The correlations
between the independent variables are shown in Table 1.5. Some of the very high correlations
are expected. For example, RelSize (relative size), FundsIdx (funds following an index), and
HerfIdx (Herfindahl index) are all trying to capture the same idea, specifically, how the
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Table 1.5. Alpha Components Correlation Matrix
Variable
ETFDum
Incept
ExpRatio
NetAssets
SDev
Turnover
NL
TrueIndex
RelSize
FundsIdx
HerfIdx

Alpha
0.2332 ***
0.0018
0.1461 **
-0.0283
0.2119 ***
0.1019
-0.0094
-0.1478 **
0.2919 ***
-0.2658 ***
0.2369 ***

ETFDum
0.2720
-0.2714
0.1133
-0.0681
-0.1560
0.2131
0.1885
0.7781
-0.4778
0.6044

***
***
*
**
***
***
***
***
***

Incept

0.0968
-0.3250 ***
-0.0152
0.0762
0.0855
-0.1128 *
0.1001
-0.3469 ***
0.3121 ***

ExpRatio

NetAssets

SDev

-0.2057 ***
0.4747 ***
0.4368 ***
-0.3376 ***
-0.6463 ***
-0.2186 ***
-0.0250
0.0264

-0.0525
-0.0787
0.0904
0.0823
0.1141 *
0.0948
-0.0614

0.3984 ***
0.0335
-0.6111 ***
-0.0287
-0.1060 *
0.1702 ***

Turnover

0.0747
-0.5922 ***
-0.1558 **
0.0494
-0.0239

Alpha Components Correlation Matrix Continued
Variable
TrueIndex
RelSize
FundsIdx
HerfIdx

NL
-0.0987
0.1430 **
-0.0922
0.1411 **

TrueIndex
0.1765 ***
0.0229
-0.0706

RelSize

FundsIdx

-0.5739 ***
0.7201 ***

-0.8415 ***

Correlation coefficients are shown for each of the variables that is used in the determination of the components of alpha. ETFDum is a
dummy equal to one if the fund is an ETF and zero if an index fund. Incept, ExpRatio, NetAssets, SDev, are the inception date (a
higher number implies the fund is newer), the fund’s expense ratio, total net assets, and standard deviation of returns. Turnover, NL,
TrueIndex, and RelSize are turnover as defined by the fund’s purchases divided by average total net assets for the year, dummy
indicating whether the fund is a no-load fund or not, a dummy indicating whether the fund is attempting to match its index with a beta
of 1.0 (true index) or some other beta, and the size of the fund relative to other funds following the same index. FundsIdx and HerfIdx
are the same for all funds that follow a single index. FundsIdx indicates the number of funds following the index, while HerfIdx is the
Herfindahl index assuming all funds following a single index represent an industry. All annual values are calculated as of June 30,
2006. *, **, *** represent correlations that are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively.
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concentration of the market affects abnormal return. The ETF dummy is correlated with all three
of these variables since ETFs generally have higher concentration percentages than index funds
in our sample. This higher concentration may be attributed to the fact that usually only one ETF
follows a given index whereas often several mutual funds will follow the index. So all money
going into ETFs following an index gets funneled into a single fund, but there are several choices
for money going into index funds. The inception date is also well correlated with FndsIdx and
HerfIdx, suggesting that indexes with newer funds following it tend to have a smaller number of
funds, and higher concentration among funds following the index. TrueIndex, the dummy
variable that describes whether or not the fund was a true index fund or not, is highly correlated
with expense ratio, standard deviation, and turnover, implying that funds targeting a beta of 1.0
with their indexes have lower expenses, lower standard deviation, and lower turnover, all of
which one would expect since the other funds all target absolute betas higher than 1.0 (i.e. higher
than 1.0 or lower than –1.0) and usually have higher volatility in their returns. The most difficult
correlation to understand is that expense ratio is positively correlated with abnormal returns at
the 5% significance level. This implies that higher expenses are correlated with higher abnormal
returns, which is counter-intuitive. However, when one realizes that some of the correlations may
be driven by the funds that are not true index funds, this correlation makes more sense. The
funds not classified as true index funds have alphas approximately 73% higher than true index
funds. Other unusual differences are expense ratio, net assets, standard deviation, and turnover,
which are much different than true index funds. Expense ratios are more than three times higher;
net assets are (on average) less than one-tenth, standard deviation is more than double, and
turnover is more than 13 times higher than true index funds. When removing these funds, the
abnormal return and expense ratio are no longer significantly correlated.
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Table 1.6 illustrates the results of these regressions using equation (4). Two variables, the
no load dummy (NL) and the true index dummy (TrueIndex) were not multiplied by the ETF
dummy and included in the regressions since they are only applicable to index funds. For this
table, each of the factors is listed on the left and seven regressions are shown that include the
standard variables found in prior literature to be important determinants of abnormal return along
with other variables that were considered for inclusion in the regression described above. All
combinations were tested. However, only the most relevant are shown due to space
considerations. Each of the four variables, TrueIndex, RelSize, FundsIdx, and HerfIdx were
included one at time to be sure that they added something to the regression. TrueIndex made the
regression worse. In all cases, including TrueIndex reduced the adjusted R-squared. Therefore, it
was not considered for the final equation. Since FundsIdx, and HerfIdx are highly correlated and
are included for the same purpose, to measure the industry concentration, we only want to
include one of them in a final regression. RelSize is highly correlated with these two variables as
well, but it is a fund-specific variable, while FundsIdx and HerfIdx are industry-specific, so it
was still considered in regressions that also include either FundsIdx or HerfIdx.

The Herfindahl index always helped our regressions slightly more than the number of
funds following an index. So, we conclude the best regression is in the last column of Table 1.6.
Therefore, we find the ETF dummy is significant in determining abnormal return suggesting
ETFs have a significantly higher abnormal return than index funds for our sample. Also, for
index funds, the relative size and Herfindahl index are significant determinants, while for ETFs,
the inception date, expense ratio, standard deviation, and relative size are all important
determinants of abnormal return. These findings suggest that managers may be able to improve
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Table 1.6. Regressions of Alpha Components
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Table 1.6. (Continued)
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performance by reducing the expense ratios and standard deviations of their portfolios. If they
have funds competing with them by tracking the same index, the fund managers may also
consider limiting the total net assets allowed to be invested into the funds since funds with lower
relative net assets tend to perform better than larger ones.

Next, we begin our look at tracking error by analyzing the correlations of all 507 pairtypes. The correlations are important to determine if there are any significant differences in the
funds that should be accounted for in later analyses. We chose the Spearman correlation since the
data is not normally distributed. Table 1.7 shows the results of the Spearman correlations. The
primary finding is that almost all funds that are not following international indexes have very
high correlations with their indexes. Over 98% of the pairs have absolute correlations higher than
90%. In fact, almost one-quarter of the pairs have correlations above 99%. We are not surprised
that most funds have a high correlation with the index that the fund is following. After all,
having a high correlation with the index is often the primary goal of the ETF or index fund. The
high Spearman correlations suggest most of the funds track their indexes well and are wellcorrelated with other funds tracking the same index.

Index funds and ETFs following international indexes reveal quite a different story,
though. None of these funds is correlated with its index at the 95% level, and most are only
correlated between 50% and 70% with their indexes. Only one international pair, the MSCI
Pacific Excluding Japan (index) and iShares MSCI Pacific Ex-Japan Index Fund (ETF), had a
lower correlation than 50%. This result may be due to the previous finding that country funds
tend to be more correlated with domestic stock indexes in the short run, while being more

45

Table 1.7. Spearman Correlations
Panel A. All Pair-Types Excluding International Funds
n = 477
Minimum Absolute
Cumulative
Frequency
Percent
Correlation
Frequency
99%
115
24.06%
115
95%
313
65.48%
428
90%
41
8.58%
469
85%
5
1.05%
474
<85%
3
0.63%
477

Cumulative
Percent
24.11%
89.73%
98.32%
99.37%
100.00%

Panel B. International Funds
n = 30
Minimum Absolute
Frequency
Correlation
95%
0
90%
2
80%
1
70%
13
60%
7
50%
5
<50%
2

Cumulative
Percent
0.00%
6.67%
10.00%
53.33%
76.67%
93.33%
100.00%

Percent
0.00%
6.90%
3.45%
44.83%
24.14%
17.24%
3.45%

Cumulative
Frequency
0
2
3
16
23
28
30

We perform a Spearman Correlation test on 507 combinations of indexes, index funds, and
ETFs. Panel A combines all pair-type correlations except Indexes with international funds
(both index funds and ETFs). The column "Frequency" shows the number of tests falling
between the specified significance levels (i.e. for Panel A, 313 pairs have correlations
between 95% and 99%).

correlated with the respective foreign index in the long run (see Chiang and Kim, 2003). In
general, from the correlations we find that we must account for international funds separately to
be sure that their poor correlations do not affect our results in an unforeseen way.

Table 1.8 shows some descriptive results for tracking error. Results are broken down into
ETFs and Index Funds, and further into Domestic and International ETFs and “True Index
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Table 1.8. Tracking Error
TE1
TE2
TE3
ALL ETFS (72)
Mean
0.425% 0.600% 0.583%
Std. Dev. 0.306% 0.406% 0.392%
Median
0.257% 0.391% 0.379%
Skewness
0.851
0.764
0.801

TE1
TE2
TE3
ALL INDEX FUNDS (177)
Mean
0.261% 0.430% 0.212%
Std. Dev. 0.682% 0.937% 0.198%
Median
0.057% 0.169% 0.163%
Skewness
4.711
4.913
3.480

DOMESTIC ETFS (46)
Mean
0.216% 0.331% 0.324%
Std. Dev. 0.092% 0.158% 0.152%
Median
0.187% 0.285% 0.277%
Skewness
1.987
1.938
1.865

TRUE INDEX FUNDS (156)
Mean
0.075% 0.179% 0.176%
Std. Dev. 0.080% 0.123% 0.115%
Median
0.053% 0.151% 0.150%
Skewness
5.781
2.942
2.472

INTERNATIONAL ETFS (26)
Mean
0.793% 1.078% 1.042%
Std. Dev. 0.172% 0.228% 0.228%
Median
0.750% 1.011% 0.994%
Skewness
1.261
1.147
1.340

OTHER INDEX FUNDS (21)
Mean
1.887% 2.627% 0.533%
Std. Dev. 1.475% 2.089% 0.443%
Median
1.586% 2.301% 0.377%
Skewness
1.265
1.355
1.033

Descriptive statistics for each of the tracking error methods are presented. ETFs and
index funds are listed separately. ETFs are separated into domestic and
international funds. Index funds are separated into “true index funds” and other
index funds. A fund is excluded from the true index fund category if it does not
attempt to exactly mimic the index that it is following. For example, Rydex funds
were excluded because they are attempting to achieve a beta of +/- 2.0 relative to
their respective indexes.
n

Tracking error 1 (TE1) is calculated as TE1, p =
calculated as TE 2, p =

∑e
t =1

n

pt

, tracking error 2 (TE2) is

1 n
2
∑ (e pt − e p ) , and tracking error 3 (TE3) is the standard
n − 1 t =1

error of the regression that regresses the ETF or index fund on the index that the
fund is attempting to follow.
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Funds” and Other Index Funds. When examining the general results for ETFs and index funds, it
appears that index funds are able to track their indexes much better than ETFs. After filtering out
the international ETFs and the “other index funds,” the results show that domestic ETFs are
much better at tracking their indexes than their international counterparts. In the same light, true
index funds are significantly better at tracking their indexes than the other index funds. When
comparing the domestic ETFs to the true index funds, the index funds still track the indexes
better as a group. However, the index funds that were not true index funds were the worst group
at tracking the index, even worse than the international ETFs. This table further confirms the
differences in domestic and international funds as well as the differences in true index funds and
other funds.

In Table 1.9, results analyzing whether tracking error is a significant factor in the flow of
funds for index funds and ETFs is presented. We show heteroskedasticity-consistent regressions
for one- and two-period fund flows using each of the three different tracking error methods.
There are a few notable results from these regressions. For one-period fund flows in Panel A, our
a priori expectation that the constant is positive and significant is confirmed. This implies that
there is a positive inflow of funds into index funds and ETFs irrespective of other factors.
Another interesting result from this table is that tracking error does affect fund flow in the
following period. Greater tracking error is associated with a decrease in fund flow during the
following period, as we expected. The adjustment for ETFs is not significant, though. An
additional finding from this table is that the third tracking error method, the standard error of the
regressions, seems to be the weakest. We expected this as well because of the inclusion of funds
in the regression that are not “true index funds.” As stated earlier, Pope and Yadav (1994) show
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Table 1.9. One- and Two-Period Fund Flows
Panel A: First period fund flows
Psi (Constant)

TE1
1.274 **
0.570

Tracking Error

-27.198 *
16.007

ETF Dummy
ETF*Tracking Error
INTL Dummy
INTL*Tracking Error
True Index Dummy
TRUE*Tracking Error
Adjusted R-squared
Number of observations:

0.398 *

TE2
1.272 **
0.570

-21.028 *
12.37

0.405 *

TE3
0.585 *
0.304

39.582
31.885

0.401 *

0.226

0.219

0.224

-35.090

-16.798

-11.811

114.30

79.345

83.047

0.593 *

0.606 *

0.614 *

0.340

0.331

0.332

-90.037

-72.060

-82.485

105.30

75.422

78.975

-1.086 *

-1.118 *

-0.434

0.572

0.572

147.370 **

107.540 ***

0.308

51.914

59.475

40.631

52.195

0.096
691

0.100
691

0.083
713
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Table 1.9. (continued)
Panel B: Second period fund flows
Psi (Constant)
Tracking Error
ETF Dummy

TE1
0.105

TE2
0.107

TE3
0.293

0.231

0.235

0.257

10.241

7.828

6.605

9.148

7.140

25.372

0.101

0.076

0.119

0.242

ETF*Tracking Error

0.208

125.370

INTL Dummy

112.750 *

103.34

66.998

60.897

1.015 ***

1.010 ***

0.774 **

0.383

INTL*Tracking Error

0.357

-173.880 *

True Index Dummy
TRUE*Tracking Error
Adjusted R-squared
Number of observations:

0.189

119.580 *

-126.440 *

0.326

-96.639

103.68

68.596

61.881

0.003

0.034

-0.148

0.232

0.237

0.259

23.025

-12.970

-14.526

27.581

16.020

29.351

0.268
449

0.270
449

0.246
472

One- and two-period fund flows were regressed on each type of tracking error with the regression:

FFt , p = ψ t , p + κ t , p TE

n
t −s, p

3

3

i =1

i =1

+ ∑ τ i ,t , p δ i + ∑ θ i ,t , p δ i TE tn− s , p

.

where FFt is fund flow at time t; ψ , κ , τ and θ are parameters; TE is the tracking error variable
at time t–s, where s = 1 and 2; n is the subscript denoting each method of calculating tracking
error; δ1 is a dummy that equals one if the fund is an ETF and zero if an index fund; δ 2 is a
dummy that equals one if the fund is an international fund and zero if it is not an international
fund; and δ 3 is a dummy that equals one if the fund is a true index fund and zero if it is not a true
index fund. Standard errors are below the coefficients. *, **, *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels of significance, respectively.

that this third tracking error method is biased, and therefore not reliable, unless the beta of the
regression is exactly equal to one. The first two tracking error methods are nearly equal, with the
second tracking error method yielding only slightly stronger results than the first method.
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In Panel B of Table 1.9, a regression for the second year is performed to see if results
carried over to the second year. Almost none of the results for the first year carry forward into
the second year. The only significant result here is the importance of the international funds. The
apparent suggestion of this result is that international funds have a significant reduction in fund
flow in the second year due to greater tracking error. We can see no reasonable explanation for
this other than that the result may have been due to an unknown unique characteristic of
international funds. Investigation into this international phenomenon may be worth pursuing in a
future study. So our conclusion from this table is that tracking error negatively affects fund flow
in the following period, but is not a factor beyond one period. This result shows that investors
pay attention to tracking error when deciding upon which investment to make. If funds are not
very good at tracking the index that they are following, investors will put more money into other
funds following the same index that track the index better.

7. Conclusion

Using daily data, we find that no indexes that have existed for more than three years have
returns that follow a normal distribution. Therefore, we use the nonparametric Wilcoxon SignedRanks Test and show that a large number of index funds do not reproduce the same median
returns as their indexes. However, when ETFs are compared with their indexes, there are
generally no significant differences. When we compare index funds to ETFs following the same
index, we find no significant differences between the medians of the returns, suggesting that
neither index funds nor ETFs can significantly outperform the other.
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By regressing index funds and ETFs on the indexes that they follow, we find the
abnormal returns are very small and virtually none were significant. However, the abnormal
returns associated with the ETFs are higher than the alphas of the index funds in 83.6% of all
cases. This result is confirmed by a pooled regression analysis and is in contrast to previous
research which concludes that index funds tend to have higher alphas than ETFs. This new
finding may be due to our use of a much broader array of ETF in this study while previous
studies are much more limited in scope, generally examining one or two ETFs. We also note that
the results are much more prevalent in funds that follow the S&P 500 than funds that do not.
Only about 30% of ETFs that follow other indexes outperform their index fund counterparts.
This finding may be the result of S&P 500 ETF managers improving their performance by
timing their modifications to these ETF so that they minimize transactions costs, a way
Gastineau (2004) says is common among index fund managers. Essentially, our results suggest
that if an investor wants to track the S&P 500, he or she should invest in ETFs, but if investing to
track another index, it would be better to invest in index funds.

When looking at the components of abnormal returns, several regressions were
performed. We find again that ETFs have higher abnormal returns than index funds. Other
important factors for index funds include the relative size of a fund when compared with other
funds following the same index and the Herfindahl index (given funds following a single index
constitute an industry). For ETFs, the inception date, expense ratio, standard deviation, and
relative size are all important determinants of abnormal return. These results suggest that
managers may have some control over the performance of ETFs by (for example) reducing
expenses and the standard deviation (risk) of their investments. However, it is not as simple for
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managers of index funds. The factors that are important are related to the industry level market
concentration of the funds following each index. To improve performance, index fund managers
would need to be able to control not only their funds, but other funds that follow the same index.

When examining the tracking errors for ETFs and index funds, we first perform
Spearman correlations on each of the 507 pair-types. They show that almost all funds not
following international indexes have very high correlations with their indexes. However, index
funds and ETFs following international indexes are only correlated with their indexes between
50% and 70% with their indexes. Also, we generally find index funds are able to track their
indexes more closely than ETFs. After filtering out the international ETFs and the “other index
funds,” the results show that domestic ETFs are much better at tracking their indexes than their
international counterparts. Also, true index funds, defined as index funds that attempt to track
their respective indexes by trying to replicate the performance of the index portfolios with a
relative beta of one, are significantly better at tracking their indexes than the other index funds.
When comparing the domestic ETFs to the true index funds, the index funds still track the
indexes better as a group. However, the index funds that were not true index funds were the
worst group at tracking the index, even worse than the international ETFs. These results inform
us that when we are looking at fund flow in the next equation, we must account for international
funds and funds that are not true index funds separately.

Finally, we analyzed tracking error to see if it is a significant factor in the flow of funds
for index funds and ETFs. We find that tracking error does affect fund flow for one period
forward, but not two. As predicted, greater tracking error is associated with a decrease in fund
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flow. Also we find that there is a positive inflow of funds into index funds and ETFs irrespective
of other factors. An additional finding from this analysis is that the standard error of the
regressions seems to be the weakest tracking error method. These results suggest that those who
invest in index funds and ETFs monitor tracking error and invest in them based at least partially
based upon the ability of the fund to closely track the index. The closer a fund tracks its index,
the more likely the investor is to invest additional funds.
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Chapter 2: Is Manager Gender Important in the Performance and
Characteristics Mutual Funds?

1. Introduction
With recent advances in the understanding the psychology of investing, it is now
commonly understood that different investors have different characteristics. Some systematic
differences between male and female investors have been documented. These include that
women tend to not have as much confidence as male investors, and women are generally more
risk averse than men (see Barber and Odean (2001), Estes and Hosseini (1988), and Bajtelsmit
and VanDerhei (1997) among others).

If these behavioral phenomena found in individual investors apply to mutual fund
managers, the implications are not insignificant. If women managers are more conservative
investors, they should invest in stocks that are more conservative, and we should see women
managing more conservative funds, such as value funds. In combination with being conservative,
if women managers are less confident with their stock picks, they should have a lower turnover
in their portfolios because they would be less confident about moving money into a new security,
so their transaction fees would be lower.

The combination of more conservative stock picks and lower turnover may imply either
higher or lower returns depending upon which trait dominates. According to modern portfolio
theory, taking greater investment risk should result in receiving a greater reward, so investing
conservatively would necessarily lead to lower returns. This implies that men should have better
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performance in their investments. However, given the empirical findings by numerous studies
(see Lakonishok et al. (1994), La Porta et al. (1997), Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Barberis
and Shleifer (2003) among others) that value stocks outperform growth stocks in the long run,1 if
females tend to invest in value-oriented stocks, then their long-term performances should be
greater than males. Not to be forgotten, lower turnover implies lower transactions costs
throughout the year, and therefore higher returns on the portfolio (see for example, Barber and
Odean (2001, 2000)). So, if female managers express both the lack of confidence trait and a
tendency toward conservative investing, women should make higher nominal returns than men.

There are some reasons for mutual fund managers, regardless of gender, to behave
differently than typical individual investors. First, fund managers’ investment choices are often
constrained by limits set forth in the fund prospectus. With some exceptions, such as sector
funds, prospectuses typically have diversification requirements that do not allow fund managers
to invest large portions of the funds that they manage in individual stocks, sectors, or other highrisk investments. A second reason for fund managers to behave differently than individual
investors is that almost all fund managers have college degrees, whereas only 28% of adults in
the United States had attained bachelor’s degrees.2 According to both Atkinson et al. (2003) and
Chevalier and Ellison (1999), more than 50% of mutual fund managers hold MBAs and more
than 35% hold CFAs. So, clearly, mutual fund managers are much more educated than the
average person in the United States. Since mutual fund managers have an obvious advantage
over the general investing public in education, and because of their legally imposed investment

1

However, Chan et al. (2002) find evidence that growth managers outperform value managers after adjusting for
style.
2
U.S. Department of Education (2005)
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constraints, fund managers of different genders may act more similarly to each other than to the
general investing public.

In this paper, the performance and investment behavior of male and female domestic
(US) stock mutual fund managers will be examined and compared for differences. This is in
contrast to work by Atkinson, et al. (2003) which limits its study of mutual funds to fixedincome funds. Due to this limitation, the authors are only able to study 72 female mutual fund
managers spread across eleven fixed income categories, two of which had no female managers.
This paper attempts to rectify this limitation to an extent by including all domestic stock funds
traded in the US as the starting sample (9,327 funds). It extends Chevalier and Ellison (1999) by
specifically studying the manager’s gender as well as including more recent data.

We find some differences in our matched comparison which suggest that female mutual
fund managers have a lower risk tolerance (standard deviation) than male managers with the
funds that they are managing. Possibly as a result of their lower risk tolerance, we also find that
they spread their risk out over more stocks and hold a lower percentage of assets in their top 10
holdings. Also, females, more than males, tend to manage no-load funds in the value category.
We also find that the determinants of abnormal returns (e.g. expense ratio, net assets, etc.) cannot
be attributed to the gender of the fund managers.

When we look at current fund managers, we only find a small significant difference in
the performance of mutual funds due to management gender when we pool all male and female
managers together and compare their abnormal returns (alphas) as a group. However, in our
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other tests for current managers, we find no differences in performance between fund managers
based upon gender.

When we examine performance within funds over time, we show that a change in the
gender composition of a fund’s management is related to performance. The strongest evidence
we find is that when a fund has a major change in the gender composition of its management, it
has significantly better returns than before the management change. There is also some evidence,
although not conclusive, that one would receive a larger increase in performance if investing in a
mutual fund that is undergoing a major decrease in the percentage of its female management,
although both increasing and decreasing the percentage of female managers will result in better
returns with new management.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section covers previous literature
relevant to the ideas presented in this paper. The third section gives a description of the data and
data sources. We present our hypotheses and models in the fourth section. Section V. enumerates
the empirical results, and the last section summarizes and concludes.

2. Literature Review
The literature regarding mutual funds and gender differences in investments is extensive.
We have, therefore broken it into four distinct sections. The first reviews the differences between
men and women in making financial decisions. The second section deals more directly with
manager-specific characteristics that may influence mutual fund returns. In the third section, we
examine specific features common to mutual funds that have been analyzed in past literature and
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have been shown to be important in determining mutual fund performance. In the final section,
we review papers that examine problems associated with the measurement of mutual fund
performance.

2.1. Gender Differences in Financial Decisions
Using account data from a large brokerage firm, Barber and Odean (2001) analyze the
common stock investments of men and women for a period of six years. They record that men
trade 45 percent more than women. This activity reduces the net returns received by men by 2.65
percentage points a year. The return achieved by women was only reduced by 1.72 percentage
points because of trading. They attribute the performance and trading activity of men to
overconfidence in their investment abilities.

Powell and Ansic (1997) also approach the topic from a behavioral finance perspective.
They use survey data and find that females were more likely to attribute good performance to
good luck and were less confident than males when controlling for a similar level of prior
experience and education. This suggests that women investors were less confident than males in
their predictions. The authors find that these results are not justified by most behavioral
explanations. Also using a psychology survey experiment, Estes and Hosseini (1988) find that
women have considerably less confidence when it comes to investment decisions. While men
would rate their own confidence at about an 8.0 on a 10-point scale, women only rate their
confidence at about 6.6. Sundén and Surette (1998) find that gender and marital status
significantly affect allocation decisions when studying defined contribution retirement plans.
Clearly the indication is that women tend to allocate their investments more conservatively than
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men. Single men choose mostly stocks in their portfolios more than single women or married
men, while married women choose mostly bonds, a significantly more conservative choice.3
Schubert et al. (1999) disagree with most current literature on the topic, especially those that find
that women are more risk averse than men based upon survey data. These authors do not use
survey data. Rather, they conduct an experiment that brings out the risk tendencies of each
gender in financial situations. For their experiment, they use two classrooms of students with
approximately 70 subjects in each (divided nearly evenly between men and women), one is used
as a control group, while the other is the studied group. They find that men and women’s risktaking behavior depends significantly on the financial decision setting.4 Also they find no
differences in risk-taking behavior in men and women facing investment and insurance-related
decisions in a controlled setting. They suggest that previous studies that amplify gender
stereotyping may be erroneous. While all of these studies assert that their results are valuable,
Powell and Ansic and Schubert et al. used students as their primary subject for their surveys and
experiments. Using students may make their results more difficult to extrapolate to the general
public due to the captive nature of their subjects and because of bias due to the age and education
of their subjects. Also, these studies use relatively small sample sizes. Again, making it difficult
to extrapolate their results to the general population. However, Estes and Hosseini use four
groups: shareholders, security analysts, institutional investors, and upper division and graduate
students. The first three groups were randomly selected by a third party. This method helps lend
validity to their findings.

3

Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei (1997), Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner (1997) and Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) have
also used surveys and other economic data and similarly discover that women invest more conservatively than men.
4
The instructions and procedures for the experiment conducted in Schubert et al. (1999) may be found (in English)
at http://www.wif.ethz.ch/gruppe_schubert/people/srenate/srenate/papers/aea99
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Atkinson, Baird, and Frye (2003) look at fixed-income mutual fund managers and
compare male and female managers to see if there is a difference in performance, risk, or other
characteristics. They find that there are no significant differences based on gender. This suggests
to them that differences found in the literature may be attributed to investor knowledge and
wealth constraints. Even though they do not find difference among the investment choices of
managers, they do find that the manager’s gender influences the investors’ decision on whether
to invest in a fund. Female fund managers receive lower fund inflows into funds that they are
managing in the first year managing a particular fund.

2.2. Manager Attributes Affecting Mutual Fund Performance
As described in the previous section, Atkinson, Baird, and Frye (2003) are the only
authors to fully analyze gender along with other characteristics in fund managers to determine
whether the manager’s gender is a factor in mutual fund performance. Although they do not look
at gender, there are other studies look at manager characteristics to determine whether other
manager attributes may affect fund performance.

In a study by Chevalier and Ellison (1999), the authors suggest that certain characteristics
of fund managers may be related to that manager’s fund performance. The variables they analyze
are: the manager’s age, the average composite SAT score at the manager’s undergraduate
institution, and whether the manager has an MBA. They do not study gender differences or
control for them. Although they find that only the undergraduate college attended by the
manager turns out to be relevant (after controlling for biases), this finding may be due to the
sample that they used. They used managers from 1988 to 1995. Some of their data was back-
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filled. Other data they used was manually entered based on assumptions about the manager’s age
when graduating college or about the schools attended by these managers. These assumptions
may introduce biases that lead the authors to incorrect conclusions. Also, Chevalier and Ellison
study a time-frame when the stocks were in the midst of a significant bull market in the United
States. Their results may not hold when considering stagnant or bear markets. Golec (1996) also
analyzes whether non-gender manager characteristics explain fund performance, risk and fees.
He runs simultaneous tests to avoid bias exhibited by other studies that do not take into account
the simultaneity. Endogenous variables in his regressions include portfolio yield and alpha,
portfolio beta and the standard deviation of residual portfolio returns, and expenses exclusive of
management fees, management fees and portfolio turnover. His exogenous variables consist of
manager age, tenure with the fund, years of education, whether or not the manager has an MBA
degree, management team size, fund age, fund assets, load charge, and fund objective. To avoid
other biases such as survivorship bias, they use a relatively short time period of three years. He
finds that manager characteristics do affect performance, risk and fees. Along with some of the
traditional fundamental variables that are important in determining performance, fees and risk,
manager age, tenure and education are important determinants.5

2.3. Other Factors Affecting Mutual Fund Performance
Mutual fund performance can be shown to be influenced by several elements that are
common to all mutual funds. Empirical testing of mutual funds has been around for almost forty
years with Jensen (1968) testing the performance of funds up until that time. In the last two
decades, studies such as Droms and Walker (2001), Ippolitio (1989), Shukla and Trzcinka
5

Gottesman and Morey (2006) emphasize the significance of manager education as an important determinant in
fund performance. They find that mutual fund managers that received MBAs from a top school achieved
significantly greater performance than other managers.
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(1992), Walker (1997) and Zera and Madura (2001) have all found links between mutual fund
performance and characteristics of these funds such as expense ratio, loads, total net assets,
portfolio risk, diversification level, and portfolio composition. While academics often find strong
relationships between performance and fund characteristics, researchers are not always in
agreement on which of these is significant. A description of some significant literature regarding
specific factors that influence mutual fund performance follows.

The literature surrounding the importance of expense ratios on mutual fund performance
shows a consensus that mutual fund expense ratios matter when determining their performance.
This is probably the only factor that is universally agreed upon by researchers to affect
performance. For example, Malhotra and McLeod (1997) and Walker (1997) show that funds
with lower management fees and expenses increase returns. Elton et al. (1996a) not only
establish that low expense funds outperform high expense funds, but that this observation holds
even when comparing load funds with low expenses with no-load funds with high annual
expenses.6 Grinblatt and Titman (1993) and Carhart (1997) show that mutual fund returns are
affected most directly by expenses and transaction costs. They determine that expenses have a
negative impact on performance that is at least proportionate to the level of the expense ratio.7
This suggests that an investor who does not have the ability to do the extensive research to find
the best fund managers can simply look for funds with low expenses to receive returns that are
comparable.8 It also suggests that the higher expense ratios do not serve a meaningful purpose
and should be avoided. However, two studies assert that higher mutual fund expense ratios do
6

Hooks (1996) comes to the same conclusion.
Fabozzi et al. (1991) conclude that any improved ability demonstrated by managers in forecasting fund
performance is negated by operating expenses and transaction costs.
8
Dellva and Olson (1998) concur with this assessment by stating that funds with superior performance tend to have
lower expense ratios.
7
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have a purpose. Droms and Walker (1995) show that expense ratios are not predictive of fund
performance by demonstrating that the funds that have higher returns typically take greater risks
and have higher expense ratios. Grinblatt and Titman (1994) have an explanation for this result.
They explain that funds that do more research and trade the most may be exposing stocks that are
underpriced. Golec (1996) suggests that higher expense ratios may be a signal that management
has superior investment skills. Obviously, these skills would imply greater fund performance. It
would seem, though, that most empirical findings refute these arguments.

As to whether load status of a fund is instrumental in affecting fund performance, it has
been documented in research (for example Kihn (1996) and Israelsen (2003)) that loads
generally negatively affect mutual fund performance. In fact studies performed by Malhotra and
McLeod (1997) and Hooks (1996) show that front-end loads perform significantly worse than
no-load funds. These studies illustrate that buying funds with front-end loads almost always will
provide a lower expected return than buying no-load funds. No studies suggest that load is not an
important factor in determining fund performance.9

The literature for total net assets (size of the fund) is a bit unclear. Droms and Walker
(1995) show that smaller funds outperform larger funds, on average. They also find that these
smaller funds invest in riskier assets, so it is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the improved
performance is due to the size or the risk. Several studies, including those by Malhotra and
McLeod (1997) show that larger funds typically produce higher returns.10 There are also studies
that show that fund size is not a determining factor at all in mutual fund performance. Grinblatt
9

However, Droms and Walker (1995) find that whether a fund has or does not have a load has no bearing on the
riskiness of the fund.
10
Markese (2000) also asserts that larger funds produce higher returns.
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and Titman (1994) present evidence that mutual fund size and performance are unrelated. They
explain that it is not possible to attain superior performance by investing in a fund based upon its
total net assets.

According to both theory and empirical evidence from noted researchers like Fama and
Macbeth (1973) and Fama and French (1992), more risk provides higher expected and higher
achieved returns.11 Droms and Walker (1995) use standard deviation to proxy for risk. They
show that risk is the most highly correlated determining factor in equity mutual fund
performance.12

Diversification, investing in different sectors and many stocks, can be used as another
proxy for risk. The more diversified the fund, the less risky it is (see for example Jennings (1971)
and Westerfield (1975)). This makes sense, because with more stocks in differing sectors, a fund
should act more like the overall market. Similar to Prather (2004), to get the diversification
effect, two proxies will be considered: the total number of holdings, and percent of assets in the
top ten holdings. Lower diversification allows for the potential for higher returns, but at a greater
risk.

Domestic mutual funds may be broken down into several “styles.” One way to categorize
style is based upon size and another is based upon value stocks versus growth stocks. Size can be
proxied easily by using the total net asset value of the fund as discussed above. The lower the
P/E ratio, the more likely the fund is value-oriented, while high P/E ratios likely will be
11

More recently, Markese (1999) comes to the same conclusion.
Many other studies, including Barber (1994) and Cloonan (2002) use historical standard deviation to measure the
risk of a mutual fund.

12
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associated with growth-oriented funds. This is also a very commonly used factor to proxy to
distinguish between growth and value securities in the literature (See Lee and Swaminathan
(2000), Hunt and Hoisington (2003) and Penman (1996) among others).13

The turnover ratio of a mutual fund is usually computed by taking a fund’s purchases or
sales and dividing by the fund’s average total net assets. A lower number implies a buy-and-hold
strategy by the fund and usually means lower trading costs which should translate into a higher
return. These ratios can be used to determine behavioral factors that influence investment
decision-making and performance in mutual funds. If men and women have systematic
differences in these variables, the performance of their portfolios could be affected. For example,
Barber and Odean (2001) found that men trade 45% more than women in their experiment with a
limited amount of data. They suggest that women should outperform men, on a risk-adjusted
basis, due to overconfidence exhibited by men as illustrated by their increased turnover ratios.
Also, the high turnover ratios usually result in higher expenses and lower performance due to
transactions costs. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Malhotra and McLeod (1997), among
others, show that lower turnover is associated with greater fund performance.14

The mutual fund manager’s length of service, or tenure is also often found to be
correlated with its performance. Golec (1996) states that it is likely that funds that show superior
performance will normally be managed by people with a lengthy tenure. This is because
13

It should be noted that Daniel et al. (1997) reported that historical measures such as P/E, price-to-book, and
market capitalization are not able to determine fund performance alone. They use composite measures that
encapsulate several fund characteristics, such as size, book-to-market, momentum, management investment timing,
and a fund’s tendency to hold certain types of stocks. As such, they call their approach a “characteristics-based”
approach. They find that these composite measures are necessary to determine fund performance accurately.
14
This is in contrast to the results achieved by Droms and Walker (1995), who find turnover is unable to predict
increased performance over any specified period.
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managers that do not consistently perform well are eventually dismissed. Markese (2000)
concludes that new managers need to prove themselves before investors should entrust him with
their funds. New managers, therefore, should be shunned until they can prove their ability to
provide superior performance.

2.4. Mutual Fund Performance Measurement
Early papers use simple linear regressions using a single-factor model such as CAPM
when analyzing mutual fund performance. For example, Jensen (1968) used CAPM to show that
mutual funds do not outperform the market on average. These methods were convenient for early
empirical studies because the cost of computing was very large compared to today’s standards.
With advances in theory, multifactor models are now most commonly used to measure
performance. Blake et al. (1993), Chavalier and Ellison (1999) and Atkinson et al. (2003) all use
index and factor models that show abnormal performance based upon controlling for systematic
differences in return. The intercept term is usually construed to be abnormal performance relative
to these given independent indexes and/or factors.

2.5. Other Considerations in Mutual Fund Performance Measurement
Malkiel (1995) studies a large set of funds from 1971 – 1991 with no survivorship bias.
He found that strategies that would have produced large excess returns in the 1970s did not
succeed in the 1980s. So, he concludes that there is no “dependable” strategy for creating
consistent excess returns over time. He also notes that survivorship bias is a bigger problem than
previously thought. Elton et al. (1996b) and Walker (1997) show that survivorship bias is a
significant problem with estimating performance. They claim that almost all previous studies use
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performance measures that overstate true performance (alpha is biased upward). This bias is
caused by the disappearance of poor performing that closed, failed, or merged into another fund.
Brown, et al. (1992) identify persistence in above average returns among all funds. This was later
determined by Carpenter and Lynch (1999) to be highly correlated with survivorship bias.
Jayaraman et al. (2002) suggest that to avoid survivorship bias, one must account for funds that
have disappeared from the database over time. To accomplish this, they use all data available for
all funds from some past starting date and predict the fund’s future per performance based upon
this data. They must track each fund through closures, mergers and name changes in order to
have a survivorship bias-free sample.

Elton et al. (1996a) look at persistence in risk-adjusted mutual fund performance
controlling for survivorship bias. They find that past performance is able to predict future mutual
fund performance on a risk-adjusted basis. They also can show that in a down market, they can
construct a portfolio of actively managed funds that outperform index funds, implying that
managers add value to the portfolios they manage. In a study that also looks at persistence in
mutual fund performance, Carhart (1997) uses a sample free of survivorship bias to show that
common factors almost completely explain persistence in equity mutual funds’ risk-adjusted
returns. The only unexplained persistence is by the worst mutual funds which show a strong
underperformance. His work suggests that managers do not add significantly to the return of the
portfolios that they manage. Prather et al. (2004) study a large set of mutual funds and examine
recent performance controlling for survivorship bias and benchmark error. Benchmark error has
been identified as the sensitivity of fund performance to the benchmark used to proxy the market
return. Using a large market capitalization benchmark such as the S&P 500 tends to bias the
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results of small capitalization funds in a positive way. The authors find that when these factors
are controlled for, most previous literature is still robust in the factors that determine fund
performance. However, their study shows that there is no persistence in fund performance.

3. Data

All data for this study were obtained from the Morningstar Principia Advanced Mutual
Funds Module dated February 29, 2004. From this CD, the following variables were obtained:
monthly returns, net assets, expense ratio, standard deviation, total number of holdings,
percentage of assets in top 10 holdings, P/E ratio, turnover, the starting date for the current
management, and whether the fund was a no-load fund or not.

Manager information was also included on this disk. This information includes the names
of all current and prior fund managers and a short biography of current managers that includes
the manager’s starting date with the fund, undergraduate and graduate degrees received along
with the year the degrees were received, and the names of the degree-granting institutions.

The data began with all 9,327 domestic (US) stock mutual funds. These funds were
extensively filtered, reducing the sample size to 2,217. The reason for the filters was to remove
all funds that have managerial traits that did not fit with comparing the male-female dynamic.
Funds that were closed to new investment were eliminated because of their differing
performance characteristics with other mutual funds. Exchange-traded funds (ETFs),
unmanaged, and team-managed funds were eliminated because there was no discernable
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manager from which to obtain information. A minimum three-year performance measure was
used to include only funds with a minimal performance track record and to assure enough data
for a monthly study. This three-year time frame is the same measure that Morningstar uses to
provide their first “Morningstar Rating.” If several classes of a fund existed (e.g. A, B, C, and I
classes), the duplicate portfolios were removed to get a more realistic number of actual differing
portfolios that were managed by women. Per Carhart (1997) the class with the longest history
was the one selected for analysis, while any other classes were filtered out. If two or more
classes have identical inception dates, the one with larger net assets is selected. Finally, “Bear
Market” and “Convertible Bond” funds are removed even though they are described by
Morningstar as domestic equity funds because of their starkly differing objectives and
characteristics from other domestic equity funds. As mentioned earlier, the filtered sample has
2,217 total funds of which 233 were primarily managed by women (10.51%). Where there was
missing data, the most recent fund report (prospectus, annual, and/or semi-annual reports) was
used to correct this deficiency.

Gottesman and Morey (2006), Atkinson, et al. (2003) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999)
use management education characteristics from the fund profile provided by Morningstar. When
reviewing these data, it was found that the education data was actually quite lacking on the data
CD provided by Morningstar. Out of the 2,217 fund managers that were in the filtered data set,
only 909 of them had any education background listed at all (41.0%). The two papers above then
proceeded to separate out the managers who held MBAs from those that did not and extrapolate
an age for the manager based on an arbitrary assumption that the manager graduated from his or
her undergraduate college at the age of 21. We found that much of the education-related material
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was dependent upon the fund family to which the mutual fund belonged. Some fund families
reported education backgrounds while others did not. This distinction illustrates a rather large
flaw in the data. Essentially, all of the papers that directly assess manager education
characteristics are analyzing only funds that belong to fund families that report their managers’
education characteristics. Since only 41% of managers had education data listed, it is clear that
there may be problems in interpreting their results that use education variables and extrapolating
those results onto the universe of fund managers. Since it appears that many of the larger fund
families do report managers’ education data (such as Fidelity and Vanguard) and many smaller
families do not, we would expect the education statistics to be biased toward higher education
than the industry average. This is because presumably the larger groups have the ability to select
top candidates at premium salaries, while many smaller groups are managed by the founder or a
few in-house managers. It also might be embarrassing to smaller groups to report lower quality
education data than their larger competitors.

From the filtered sample of 2,217 total funds, two sub-samples are used in this study. In
one sub-sample, the 233 female managers are matched based upon size and tenure, standard
deviation (risk) and tenure, and the percent of assets in the top 10 holdings and tenure with their
closest male counterparts. The first match (size and tenure) attempts to alleviate bias based on
diseconomies of scale and manager experience. This matching is similar to Atkinson, et al.
(2003). The second match (standard deviation and tenure) attempts to alleviate a potential selfselection bias as well as control for manager experience. The self-selection bias occurs because
the population of mutual fund managers may not represent the typical person as far as their riskaversion. If there is a disparity between the population of female and male managers relative to
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the overall population, then a bias is introduced. So, we attempt to control for risk aversion using
the standard deviation match. The final match (the percent of assets in the top 10 holdings and
tenure) was used because we noticed in our matched sample of 233 male and female managers,
the male managers in the matched sample had significantly different means for their percent of
assets in the top 10 holdings from the full sample. So, this match was to control for a potential
bias in asset concentration between the matched sample and the full sample of male domestic
equity fund managers. Thus, the final sample used for this part of the analysis consists of the 233
female managers and their 233 male counterparts, or 466 total managers and funds.

In the other sub-sample, from the original filtered sample of 2,217 funds, all funds were
selected that had at one time (since March 1984) a major change in management gender
composition, either from female to male or male to female. A major change is defined as at least
50% of the managers of a fund at a specific time must be female (male) and change to at least
50% male (female). Examples might include funds that change from 100% male to 50% female
or 100% female to 67% male. Also, the same manager composition must remain in control of the
fund for at least 12 months both before and after the date of change in gender composition. This
resulted in a sample of 102 funds with a total of 150 gender composition changes. Of the 150
changes in the sample, 90 were male to female changes, with the remainder being female to male
changes.
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Factors for the regression analyses were obtained from Kenneth French’s website. These
include Rm-Rf, HML, SMB and UMD.15 Rm-Rf represents the market returns; HML represents
a value factor; SMB represents a size factor; and UMD represents a momentum factor.

4. Hypotheses and Models

It appears that the majority of academic research agrees that, in general, men and women
have systematic behavioral differences in the way that they invest. Women tend to be more risk
averse than men. However, do these differences in investing behavior carry over to the
presumably more experienced mutual fund managers? In the only study that attempted to find
differences between mutual fund managers based upon their gender, Atkinson, et al. (2003) were
unable to find a significant difference in performance between male and female mutual fund
managers when studying 72 male and 72 female domestic fixed-income managers. Schubert et
al. (1999) conduct an experiment that provides supporting evidence for this conclusion. They
argue that the differences in investment choices between men and women found by others are the
product of survey data which lack adequate controls for individual risk-taking behavior. Both of
these studies suffer from small sample sizes and other problems noted in the literature review.
However, taken together, if their results hold, then given their superior training and knowledge
of investments relative to the general public, it is likely that performance differences between
male and female fund managers are insignificant. If the majority of behavioral investment
literature is correct, and males and females invest in systematically different ways, then we might
see this also appear in mutual fund managers. Female managers should have lower turnover,
15

Construction of these variables can be found on Kenneth French’s data library web site at
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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invest more in conservative stocks than their male counterparts. This should ultimately lead to
higher returns due to the lower transactions costs and the long-term advantage of the more
conservative value stocks over growth stocks. This leads us to the hypotheses that we will
discuss in this paper.

Hypothesis 1 (NULL): Within styles of mutual funds, fund characteristics do not vary
dependent upon the fund manager’s gender.

The alternative to Hypothesis 1 is that within styles of mutual funds, fund characteristics
vary significantly depending upon whether the fund manager is male or female. If we find that
differences exist, it will confirm that the evidence in the literature regarding differences in
investment choices of males and females also applies to mutual fund managers. Our expectation
is that there are no differences between genders, but if we find differences, we would expect that
female managers are more conservative in their investments.

To test this hypothesis, we will do a comparison of means between female and male
mutual fund managers who manage funds within each of the following fund styles: value, blend,
growth, and other funds.16 Paired t-tests are performed for the following fund characteristics
which are widely regarded in the literature as being important to determining mutual fund
returns: expense ratio, standard deviation (proxy for risk), number of holdings (proxy for
diversification), percentage of assets in top 10 holdings (proxy for concentration and
diversification), P/E ratio (proxy for value), turnover as defined by purchases or sales (whichever
16

Other funds includes funds that consist primarily of domestic stocks that are not able to be categorized in one of
the aforementioned categories. These include sector funds and funds that have a relatively high percentage of bonds
in the fund’s investment mix (>20%).
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is less) divided by the average monthly net assets, whether the fund was a no-load fund or not,
net assets (fund size) and the length of the manager’s tenure (to control for experience). For this
analysis, we use matched sub-samples of the data. Each female-managed fund in the full sample
is matched with a male-managed fund in three different ways. The first match is based upon size
and tenure; the second is based upon standard deviation (risk) and tenure; and the third is based
upon the percent of assets in the top 10 holdings and tenure. In the first match, net assets (size)
and fund manager tenure should not different at any level of significance since the sample
already controls for these variables. The same logic holds true for standard deviation and tenure
and the percent of assets in the top 10 holdings and tenure in the second and third sample
pairings.

Hypothesis 2: Returns do not vary in a systematic way due to the gender of the fund
manager.

When considering the performance of mutual fund managers, we expect that the
similarities in the education and experience of fund managers will outweigh the differences in
gender. If we find differences in fund performance, it will inform investors how to increase
returns based upon the gender characteristics of mutual fund management. Further, it will inform
the mutual funds, themselves, how to adjust their management gender compositions to increase
performance. If there are both characteristic differences (as in our first hypothesis) and
performance differences, mutual fund managers may be able to learn how to alter behavior to
remove the differences in gender characteristics and performance.
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In examining the performance of the male- and female-managed mutual funds, two basic
models are used, a one-index model and a multi-factor model. These are similar to the models
advocated by Blake, Elton, and Gruber (1993) in their study of fixed income funds. The primary
difference is that Blake, Elton, and Gruber studied fixed-income mutual funds, whereas the
models here focus on the domestic equity market. Also, we incorporate the momentum factor in
our four-factor model. The one-index model used is:

rp ,t = α p + β p I t + ε p ,t
where rp ,t is the excess return on the pth fund during month t,
on the portfolio,

(1)

α p is the abnormal excess return

β p is the standard market-model risk measure, and I t is the excess return on a

domestic stock index portfolio. We use the Russell 1000 index and the S&P 500 index for the
market index. The Russell 1000 was chosen because it was the best-fit index for all domestic
equity funds based upon the adjusted-R-squared in single-index regressions run against the
monthly returns of each mutual fund independently.17 The S&P 500 was also chosen because
data is available from March 1984, the beginning of our sample period. Returns were not
available for the Russell 1000 until January 1993. We also use the S&P 500 for robustness
comparisons and because it is much more widely used in the literature as a proxy for the market
index.

The multi-factor model used in this paper is:

17

Morningstar reported the Russell 1000 was the best-fit index for more funds than for any other index, with the
S&P 500 the best fit index for the second largest number of funds. We independently ran regressions and verified
this data.
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J

rp ,t = α p + ∑ β p ,i I i ,t + ε p ,t
i =1

where rp ,t is the excess return on the pth fund during month t,
on the portfolio,

(2)

α p is the abnormal excess return

β p ,i are the sensitivities of the excess returns on the factors, I i ,t are the

systematic factors that account for the return, and J is the number of systematic factors
employed in the model (three and four for this paper).

The three-factor model uses the Fama-French factors, Rm–Rf, SMB, and HML. We use
these factors because of the significant body of literature in the last fifteen years linking the
factors to explaining returns (Fama and French, 1992). Rm–Rf is a value-weighted excess return
on the market. SMB (Small Minus Big) is the average return on three small portfolios minus the
average return on three big portfolios. It encapsulates the idea that small company stocks
outperform large company stocks over time. HML (High Minus Low) is the average return on
two value portfolios minus the average return on two growth portfolios. HML encompasses the
assertion that value stocks (high book-to-market) outperform growth stocks (low book-tomarket) over time. For the four-factor model, the Fama-French factors are used along with a
momentum factor. Momentum was originally suggested as important for determining returns by
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Carhart (1997) employs a momentum factor and finds that it
significantly improves the ability of his model to predict fund returns. The momentum factor
used is called UMD (Up Minus Down). It is the average return on the two high prior return
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portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios from six valueweighted portfolios formed on size and prior returns.18

Analysis is performed using the one-index and multi-factor models in several ways. In
the first half of the analyses, we look at only current managers. First, we regress all 2,217 funds
individually using OLS to obtain an abnormal return (alpha). Then we compare the means using
a t-test. If the t-test is significant, we will be able to tell which gender typically produces higher
returns. In our second analysis, we include a dummy with each fund to show whether the fund is
currently managed by a male or a female. The models are appended as follows:

rp ,t = α p + β p I t + γ p Genderp + ε p ,t

(1A)

J

rp ,t = α p + ∑ β p ,i I i ,t + γ p Genderp + ε p ,t
i =1

(2A)

where Gender is equal to one if the current manager is female and zero if male. All 2,217 funds
were analyzed using a pooled-regression technique to see if the dummy, and therefore gender, is
significant. If the dummy is positive and significant, then female managers produce better returns
than male managers. Our third test with current managers is a pooled regression comparison of
all female managers and all male managers. The alpha for female managers is compared to the
alpha from male managers using a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) technique. We
subtract the return of the male managers from the return of the female managers. If the result is
positive and significant, then current female fund managers outperform current male managers.

18

The UMD factor and the Fama-French factors are available to the public from Kenneth French’s web site at
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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The second half of our next analysis is performed by using the second sub-sample of the
data. Using 102 funds that include 150 major changes in management gender, the single-index
and multi-factor models are expanded by introducing a dummy into the models to indicate when
a fund had a major change in the gender composition as defined in the data section. Here we are
directly comparing two time periods within the management of a single mutual fund. We use this
sub-sample because a difference in abnormal returns between genders should be easier to
determine when there is a major change in the gender composition of management than when
only a minor change occurs. For example, it should be easier to differentiate the performance
differences in gender when management changes from 33% female to 100% female than when it
changes from 25% female to 33% female. Here we introduce a dummy, Change, into the oneindex and multi-factor models to indicate the months tested with a larger proportion of female
managers. The adjusted equations are as follows:

rp ,t = α p + β p I t + γ p Change p ,t + ε p ,t

(1B)

J

rp ,t = α p + ∑ β p ,i I i ,t + γ p Change p ,t + ε p ,t
i =1

(2B)

where Change is equal to one when there is a higher percentage of female managers between the
two periods, and zero denotes a relatively higher percentage of male managers between the two
periods. The dummy remains equal to zero (or one) for the period of the earlier management
tenure just before there is a change in management. When new management takes over the fund,
we skip a six-month window to allow new management to be fully in control of the fund’s assets
(and therefore, return). Then we allow the dummy to change to one (or zero) and remain there
during the period of the later management tenure. We use both 12- and 24-month periods for
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robustness and to be sure that we are using enough data. See the diagram for a timeline of the
data used for this analysis.

Old Management Period

12- or 24-month
tested period

New Management Period

6-month window
(not tested)

12- or 24-month
tested period

First, a panel regression (see Greene, 2003) is run to determine if the change in gender is
significant. The models are implemented on as many of the 150 management gender changes as
possible, given the restrictions above. We also separate the sample into male-to-female changes
and the female-to-male changes in management gender. Since in all cases, the change dummy is
equal to one for an increase in female management, a positive and significant result for this
dummy will indicate that female management outperforms male management over time within a
fund.

In our second analysis of changes in manager gender, we run a panel regression
comparison of all female managers and all male managers and do a test that is similar to one that
we performed with current managers. The alpha for female managers is compared to the alpha
from male managers using a SUR technique. This analysis is performed for all gender changes as
well as male-to-female and the female-to-male changes in management gender. We subtract the
return of the male managers from the return of the female managers. If the result is positive and
significant, then female managers outperform male managers over time within a fund.
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Our third analysis of changes in manager gender uses the actual percentage of female
managers for each month of the fund’s existence, or as far back as March 1984, whichever is
less. Again, we use the second sub-sample of data of 102 funds that include 150 major changes
in management gender. We also use the panel regression technique for this analysis to determine
whether gender is related to the performance of the funds. The new equations look similar to the
equations for the previous analysis, except that the introduced term has changed:

rp ,t = α p + β p I t + γ p Female p ,t + ε p ,t

(1C)

J

rp ,t = α p + ∑ β p ,i I i ,t + γ p Female p ,t + ε p ,t
i =1

(2C)

where Female is equal to the percentage of female managers managing the fund in any given
month t. Here, if the coefficient for Female is positive and significant, then the percentage of
female management is positively related to the performance of the fund over time.

Hypothesis 3: Gender differences in factors that influence abnormal excess returns are
insignificant

In our last major analysis, we look at differences in factors that influence abnormal
excess returns to see if there are any significant differences between genders. If we find that
there are differences in factors that affect abnormal returns, the results of this analysis can be
used in conjunction with the first two hypotheses presented earlier in this paper to inform
investors what to look for in a fund to increase returns. It can also show mutual fund managers
how factors differ between genders and how that influences returns to the funds. If differences
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are found, it may also have implications on future management behavior. The gender that has the
characteristic that reduces returns should be able to alter their behavior to increase returns by
altering a specific characteristic of their investment behavior. For example, if we find that
females have lower turnover, and turnover affects abnormal excess returns negatively, then male
managers may wish to reduce the turnover in funds that they manage to increase performance.

When attempting to see if the gender of the manager was an important determinant in the
factors that influence abnormal performance of funds, a multi-factor regression was run on
domestic equity mutual funds that were distinctly managed by men and women (rather than a
management team or computer). The model used is:

αˆ = C + ∑ λ V + φ D + ∑ θ V D + ε
n

p

p

n

i,p

i,p

p

p

i =1

where

α̂

p

i,p

i,p

p

p

i =1

(3)

represents the abnormal excess return on the fund, C p is a linear constant, V are the

individual factors of the fund (from 1 to n),

λ is a slope coefficient for each V, D p is a dummy

that is equal to one if the fund is managed by a female and zero if the fund is managed by a male,

φ p is an adjustment for the constant term given that the fund is managed by a female, and θ is
the slope adjustment for each V, given that the fund is managed by a female. The factors used
were the expense ratio, loads, net assets, portfolio risk (standard deviation of monthly returns),
diversification variables (number of holdings, and percent of assets in top 10 holdings) and fund
manager investment style (P/E and turnover). Abnormal excess return,

α̂

p

, is calculated using

each of the single-index models and multi-factor models described under Hypothesis 2,
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equations (1) and (2). Also, abnormal excess return and standard deviation are calculated for the
tenure of the manager. The other factors are taken as of February 29, 2004.

Essentially, this hypothesis is testing whether each

θ

p

is equal to zero. If any θ is

significantly different from zero, the factor associated with that θ will affect abnormal excess
returns differently for male and female fund managers. For example, if θ is positive and
significant for turnover, then female managers have higher abnormal excess returns than male
managers due to their turnover (which is likely lower). Also, note that this analysis is done on a
cross-sectional basis for a single time period (February 2004).

5. Empirical Results

A description of female domestic equity mutual fund managers relative to total funds in
each category is illustrated in Table 2.1. All funds are separated into four categories: value,
blend, growth and other. In Panel A, two things are apparent. First, female managers comprise
only about 10.5% of all domestic equity mutual fund managers. This is significant in that it is a
major constraint to the sample size when matching the female managers to male counterparts. It
was based primarily upon the dearth of women fund managers that we were able to rather easily
match funds in each of the three ways described earlier. Ultimately, there were ample male
managers from which to choose a fund to match each female manager. The second thing that one
might notice here is that females are slightly over-represented in the blend category and underrepresented in the value category. Almost 12% of blend managers are female, while only a little
over 9% of value managers are female.
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Table 2.1. Female Domestic Equity Mutual Fund Managers

Panel A. Female Managers as a Percentage of Funds by Category
Category
Value
Blend
Growth
Other
Total

# of Female Managers

Total Funds

35
68
75
55
233

373
576
732
536
2,217

Percentage
9.38%
11.81%
10.25%
10.26%
10.51%

Panel B. Female Managers by Category as a Percentage of All Female Managers
and Total Funds by Category as a Percentage of All Funds
Category
Value
Blend
Growth
Other
Total

# of Female Managers

Percentage

Total Funds

Percentage

35
68
75
55
233

15.02%
29.18%
32.19%
23.61%
100.00%

373
576
732
536
2,217

16.82%
25.98%
33.02%
24.18%
100.00%

Note: This table illustrates the relative proportion of domestic equity fund managers that are
female. Only funds actively managed primarily by a single male or female manager were
considered when compiling this table. All data was obtained from the Morningstar Principia
Advanced Mutual Funds Module dated February 29, 2004.
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Panel B of Table 2.1 gives us a different view of the same information in Panel A. In
Panel B, we can see that the total number of female managers is lowest for value funds, but also
that it is lower than the percentage of total value funds to all funds. Also, we see that 29% of
female mangers manage a blend fund. This is somewhat higher than the proportion of blend
funds to total funds (26%). For the growth and “other” categories, the proportion of female
managers is almost identical to the overall proportion of female managers to total funds. These
two panels taken together suggest that there is a tendency for females to manage blend funds and
not to manage value funds.

Categorized comparisons of male and female fund managers for each of 10 fund
characteristics are listed in Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4. Each category compares all distinct female
fund managers in that category with a portfolio of matched male-managed mutual funds of the
same category. The funds were separated into the value, blend, growth, and other style
categories. The categories were not separated by size (i.e. large cap, mid cap and small cap)
because separating the funds by size will reduce the sample size in some categories to as low as
four. Comparisons in categories with such a small sample size are not statistically meaningful.
We attempted to control for this shortcoming by matching the funds by total net assets in one of
the tables. All funds were matched within their categories (value, blend, growth and other) to a
male managed fund based upon net assets and tenure (Table 2.2), standard deviation and tenure
(Table 2.3) and percentage of assets in top 10 holdings and tenure (Table 2.4). The first match
(size and tenure) attempts to alleviate bias based on diseconomies of scale and manager
experience. The second match (standard deviation and tenure) attempts to alleviate a potential
self-selection bias as well as control for manager experience. The third match (the percent of
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assets in the top 10 holdings and tenure) is to control for a potential bias in asset concentration
between the matched sample and the full sample of male domestic equity fund managers.1

In Table 2.2, we match by net assets (size) and tenure. Matched in this manner, there appear to
be several statistically significant differences in the way that male managers and female
managers manage their funds. In the value category, there were significant differences in two of
the 10 variables tested: the turnover ratio and whether or not the fund was a no-load fund. These
results suggest that in the value category female managers have a higher turnover ratio, and a
higher propensity to manage a no-load fund. The higher turnover is very surprising given the
theoretical background that females tend to trade less in the general population. In the blend
category, the only significant difference found was in the P/E ratio of the funds. Female fund
managers tend to have a slightly higher P/E ratio than males. In the growth category, females
have a lower propensity to manage a no-load fund. And, in the “other funds” category, which
includes all domestic stock funds in the original data set that were not characterized as value,
blend or growth, the only significant difference between female and male managers was in the
concentration of the fund. Female managers invest significantly less assets in their top ten
holdings.

An analysis was also performed on all 466 funds (all 233 female- and 233 matched malemanaged funds). There were significant differences in three categories when all funds were
considered together. Male fund managers have a higher standard deviation in returns than their
female counterparts. Also, male managers tend to concentrate their assets more in their top ten

1

Note: Univariate results, such as these, do not control for various factors that might affect returns. A clearer picture
will emerge with the multivariate analysis.
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Table 2.2. Male and Female Fund Managers Comparison of Means (Net Assets and Tenure)

Category
(Observations)
Value (35 pairs)
Male
Female
p-value
Blend (68 pairs)
Male
Female
p-value
Growth (75 pairs)
Male
Female
p-value
Other Funds (55 pairs)
Male
Female
p-value
All Funds (233 pairs)
Male
Female
p-value

Expense
Ratio

Standard
Deviation

Total Number % Assets in Top
of Holdings
10 Holdings

P/E Ratio

Turnover
Ratio

No-load

Net
Assets

Tenure
(Days)

1.268
1.142
0.205

17.549
17.938
0.575

107.9
125.3
0.486

26.269
29.344
0.124

16.091
16.166
0.861

53.914
71.829
0.050**

0.457
0.800
0.003***

1959.89
2028.78
0.430

1461
1477
0.873

1.212
1.159
0.544

18.452
18.240
0.702

277.5
254.0
0.804

26.457
24.515
0.407

18.193
18.803
0.096*

87.851
78.235
0.440

0.588
0.691
0.211

529.72
532.08
0.821

1497
1496
0.997

1.399
1.380
0.775

22.027
20.877
0.108

99.0
111.9
0.391

25.665
23.844
0.193

23.597
24.613
0.165

128.797
112.160
0.263

0.640
0.480
0.045**

501.17
490.37
0.437

1341
1378
0.567

1.496
1.400
0.398

19.012
16.339
0.220

197.5
272.8
0.146

40.577
29.828
0.006***

22.113
20.351
0.311

193.891
114.145
0.135

0.418
0.545
0.164

437.11
382.37
0.470

1312
1240
0.159

1.348
1.286
0.160

19.599
18.595
0.089*

176.4
193.1
0.479

29.507
26.279
0.011**

20.519
20.653
0.794

121.074
96.670
0.086*

0.545
0.605
0.151

713.500
708.140
0.813

1398
1395
0.931

Note: This table shows a comparison of means and p-values (to report the significance of the difference between the two paired
sample means) for several important variables that are related to a fund’s investment objective or to its management style. In each
category, a portfolio of fund returns is averaged and the means are compared with those of the opposite gender. The number in
parentheses next to each category name is the number of distinct female fund managers that exist in that category. These were
matched by total assets and tenure to the list of funds managed by male managers, and the closest matches were selected for the male
portfolio. All data was obtained from the Morningstar Principia Advanced Mutual Funds Module dated February 29, 2004.
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level.
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holdings suggesting they may be less diversified than female managers, and they have a
significantly higher turnover ratio than female managers. This result, based upon all 233 matched
fund pairs, is what is expected of the general population. As noted earlier, female managers in
the value category have a higher turnover than males, but when all of the categories are
combined, another story emerges. The value category is where female managers are the least
represented among all domestic funds. In all of the other categories, males have a higher
turnover ratio, although the difference is not significant. Ultimately, these differences overwhelm
the significant difference in the value category and when all funds are compared, male managers
have the greater propensity to trade with a significantly higher turnover ratio.

In Table 2.3, we match by standard deviation (risk) and tenure. Matched in this manner,
some of the differences remain, but some are not robust to the different matching scheme. In the
value category, significant differences are found in the total number of holdings and whether or
not the fund was a no-load fund. Total number of holdings was not significant in the previous
match, however the fund’s no-load status remained significant. Also, in the first match, turnover
was significant, but that difference disappeared when matching based upon standard deviation.
Females in the value category under the current match hold more stocks and are more likely to
manage a no-load fund than male managers. In the blend category, the P/E ratio was significant
in the first match, but failed to retain its significance when match by standard deviation.
However, the percentage of assets in the manager’s top 10 holdings and the turnover ration were
significant for blend managers in this match. Here, female managers hold less assets in their top
10 holdings and have a higher turnover ratio than males. In the growth category, the no-load
status is no longer significant, but the percentage of assets in the top 10 holdings and the P/E
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Table 2.3. Male and Female Fund Managers Comparison of Means (Standard Deviation and Tenure)

Category
(Observations)
Value (35 pairs)
Male
Female
p-value
Blend (68 pairs)
Male
Female
p-value
Growth (75 pairs)
Male
Female
p-value
Other Funds (55 pairs)
Male
Female
p-value
All Funds (233 pairs)
Male
Female
p-value

Expense
Ratio

Standard
Deviation

Total Number % Assets in Top
of Holdings
10 Holdings

P/E Ratio

Turnover
Ratio

No-load

Net
Assets

Tenure
(Days)

1.261
1.142
0.205

18.177
17.938
0.237

86.3
125.3
0.057*

30.474
29.344
0.740

16.803
16.166
0.479

59.743
71.829
0.219

0.629
0.800
0.057*

1490.847
2028.775
0.748

1393
1477
0.291

1.155
1.159
0.867

18.199
18.240
0.460

166.2
254.0
0.122

34.240
24.515
0.005***

18.494
18.803
0.447

57.358
78.235
0.044**

0.647
0.691
0.568

676.981
532.081
0.463

1451
1497
0.326

1.458
1.380
0.356

20.818
20.877
0.333

95.4
111.9
0.408

29.011
23.844
0.004***

23.266
24.613
0.045**

125.360
112.160
0.317

0.613
0.480
0.105

328.468
490.370
0.291

1337
1379
0.383

1.377
1.400
0.819

16.299
16.339
0.564

159.9
272.8
0.077*

39.346
29.828
0.019**

19.364
20.351
0.407

143.800
114.145
0.456

0.473
0.545
0.455

1039.182
382.367
0.248

1223
1240
0.680

1.320
1.286
0.376

18.590
18.595
0.913

130.4
193.1
0.007***

33.197
26.279
0.000***

19.942
20.653
0.082*

100.194
96.670
0.747

0.592
0.605
0.768

772.551
708.140
0.825

1362
1395
0.220

Note: This table shows a comparison of means and p-values (to report the significance of the difference between the two paired
sample means) for several important variables that are related to a fund’s investment objective or to its management style. In each
category, a portfolio of fund returns is averaged and the means are compared with those of the opposite gender. The number in
parentheses next to each category name is the number of distinct female fund managers that exist in that category. These were
matched by total assets and tenure to the list of funds managed by male managers, and the closest matches were selected for the male
portfolio. All data was obtained from the Morningstar Principia Advanced Mutual Funds Module dated February 29, 2004.
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level.
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ratio are significant. Female managers in the growth category hold less assets in the top 10
holdings and have a higher P/E ratio. In the “other” category, the percentage of assets in the top
10 holdings retained its significance from the first match. Also significant in this match is the
total number of holdings, with females holding more stocks and less assets in their top 10
holdings.

When all categories are merged there are three characteristic that are significantly
different between male and female managers. Females hold significantly more stocks and have a
significantly lower concentration in their top 10 holdings. Also, the P/E ratio for females is
higher than male managers. As with the net assets and tenure match, the results for all 233
matched pairs when matched on standard deviation and tenure are in line with what one would
expect of the general population of male and female investors.

In Table 2.4, we match female funds again to male funds, this time based upon the
percentage of assets in the top 10 holdings and tenure. In the value category, the total number of
holdings is significant along with whether or not the fund was a no-load fund. Females hold
significantly more stocks than males in this category. Also, females are more likely to manage a
no-load fund, a finding that we showed was significant in both of the other matches. In the blend
category, there were no significant differences between male and female managers based upon
this match. In the growth category, the only significantly different characteristic was whether the
fund was a no-load fund or not. However, in this category, males were more likely than females
to manage a no-load fund. In the “other” category, the only significant difference is in the
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Table 2.4. Male and Female Fund Managers Comparison of Means (% Assets in Top 10 Holdings and Tenure)

Category
(Observations)
Value (35 pairs)
Male
Female
p-value
Blend (68 pairs)
Male
Female
p-value
Growth (75 pairs)
Male
Female
p-value
Other Funds (55 pairs)
Male
Female
p-value
All Funds (233 pairs)
Male
Female
p-value

Expense
Ratio

Standard
Deviation

Total Number % Assets in Top
of Holdings
10 Holdings

P/E Ratio

Turnover
Ratio

No-load

1.293
1.142
0.170

18.208
17.938
0.733

94.743
125.257
0.056*

1.135
1.159
0.770

18.530
18.240
0.478

1.327
1.380
0.517

Net
Assets

Tenure
(Days)

29.318
29.344
0.961

15.863
16.166
0.516

103.735
71.829
0.268

0.514
379.711
0.800
2028.775
0.010***
0.307

278.926
254.000
0.486

24.770
24.515
0.192

18.902
18.803
0.877

62.897
78.235
0.106

0.647
0.691
0.594

775.361
532.081
0.460

1456
1497
0.284

21.634
20.877
0.201

122.836
111.907
0.506

23.860
23.844
0.777

23.897
24.613
0.258

190.493
112.160
0.148

0.627
0.480
0.078*

609.366
490.370
0.485

1335
1379
0.176

1.465
1.400
0.567

19.711
16.339
0.063*

289.164
272.818
0.795

30.119
29.828
0.273

21.318
20.351
0.483

162.964
114.145
0.309

0.600
0.545
0.606

1440.923
382.367
0.152

1286
1240
0.284

1.299
1.286
0.736

19.760
18.595
0.019**

204.130
193.103
0.587

26.423
26.319
0.228

20.610
20.653
0.962

133.853
96.670
0.083*

0.609
0.605
0.927

819.604
708.140
0.724

1356
1395
0.174

1355
1477
0.175

Note: This table shows a comparison of means and p-values (to report the significance of the difference between the two paired
sample means) for several important variables that are related to a fund’s investment objective or to its management style. In each
category, a portfolio of fund returns is averaged and the means are compared with those of the opposite gender. The number in
parentheses next to each category name is the number of distinct female fund managers that exist in that category. These were
matched by total assets and tenure to the list of funds managed by male managers, and the closest matches were selected for the male
portfolio. All data was obtained from the Morningstar Principia Advanced Mutual Funds Module dated February 29, 2004.
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level.
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standard deviation, with female managers having somewhat lower standard deviation in the
returns of the funds that they manage.

When reviewing and analyzing Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 together, it is difficult to draw an
unambiguous conclusion based upon the paired t-test results. Many of the results that look
promising in the separate categories do not hold when funds are matched using different
methods. However, there are some common results that may be seen in all three tables. First, Net
assets and expense ratio are never significantly different between the genders. This holds across
all categories and all tables. The most clearly significant result is that females are more likely to
manage a no-load fund in the value category than are males. This result is robust to all three
types of matches. Also, we note that when looking at the all 233 matched pairs, standard
deviation is significant in both tables that are not matched by standard deviation. Females
typically achieve less standard deviation in returns than their male counterparts. Along the same
lines, the percentage of assets in the top 10 holdings is significant in both tables that are not
matched by percentage of assets in the top 10 holdings. Females have a significantly lower
percentage of assets in their top 10 holdings suggesting that they spread the assets in their funds
out over a larger number of holdings. One other result that we see is that the total number of
holdings is significant in two of the three matches, suggesting that it may be significant
depending upon the fund manager’s gender. In this case, females have significantly more
holdings than males. Each of these findings lead to the conclusion that we would expect from a
sample of the general public (see Barber and Odean (2001) among others). The argument is that
essentially, females have a lower risk tolerance (standard deviation). Therefore, they spread their
risk out over many stocks and hold few assets in their top 10 holdings.
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Because many of the significant results from Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 seem to suggest the
same idea, we were interested to see if these factors are highly correlated. As shown below they
are not very highly correlated, but the correlations are significant in two of the three cases. The
largest absolute correlation is about 32%. The correlation presented is correlation of the three
matched sets of male- and female-managed funds combined. Funds with 10 or less holdings and
funds with missing data were removed. Funds that were in multiple matches were only counted
once, leaving a final sample of 821 funds.

Characteristic 1
Characteristic 2
% Assets in Top 10 Holdings
Standard Deviation
% Assets in Top 10 Holdings
Total Number of Holdings
Total Number of Holdings
Standard Deviation
*** Correlation is significant at the 1% level

Correlation
0.016 .
–0.315***
–0.168***

Since there are significant correlations, it is possible that one or more of the significant
pairings may be due to the correlation between the variables. For example, the total number of
holdings may only be significantly different between the genders because number of holdings is
significantly correlated to % Assets in Top 10 Holdings. We have not tested for this possibility.

The next group of tables, Tables 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 present our analysis of current mutual
fund managers. This is also where we begin examining whether gender is a factor in mutual fund
performance. In Table 2.5, we present some descriptive statistics for individual regressions run
on returns of female and male funds. Also a t-test was performed to see if the means of the two
samples was equal. All 2,217 funds were examined for this table. The most notable result here is
that almost none of the means between female and male managers are significantly different.
This result holds true for both single-index models as well as the Fama-French 3-factor model.
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Table 2.5. T-Test of Equal Means for Individual Regressions on Current Fund Managers
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The only exceptions are in the Carhart 4-factor model. Here, the momentum factor (UMD) is
significantly different at the 5% level indicating that female managers display more momentum
behavior in their investing techniques. Also in the Carhart model, the abnormal returns (alpha)
are lower for female managers, although, this result is only significant at the 10% level.

In Table 2.6, we analyze panel data, but only for the managers currently in control of
their funds using equations (1A) and (2A). All 2,217 funds were used for this analysis. GENDER
is a dummy that is equal to one if the fund is currently being managed by a female, and zero if
being managed by a male. A pooled regression is performed. The results show that the gender
dummy is not significant in any of the four models. So, from this regression, one may conclude
that the mutual fund manager’s gender does not affect fund performance cross-sectionally among
current fund managers.

Our third analysis for current managers is presented in Table 2.7. Here we run separate
pooled regressions on all fund returns currently being managed by either a female or a male.
Abnormal returns are then obtained and compared between genders using a seemingly unrelated
regressions (SUR) technique. We subtract the male alpha from the female alpha, and then see if
the result is significantly positive or negative. The first thing to notice in this table is that all of
the abnormal return (alpha) coefficients are significant except for the one for female managers
using the Fama-French 3 factors. Also, all alphas are positive except for the ones reported with
the Carhart factors. So, it is very dependent on the factors used as to whether one would believe
that managers outperform the market or underperform the market. Next, we notice that female
managers always have lower alphas than male managers. We also find that the difference in
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Table 2.6. Gender Significance in Current Mutual Fund Managers

100

Table 2.7. Alpha Comparison for Current Managers
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alphas is significant in all four regressions. This indicates that current female managers, as a
group, perform slightly worse than their male counterparts, between (0.01% and 0.06% per
month). When reviewing all three analyses of current managers from Tables 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7, we
can say it seems that for current managers, gender is not a significant factor in determining
returns of individual funds, but, when all funds are analyzed simultaneously as a group, female
managers exhibit slightly lower performance than their male counterparts.

Beginning with Table 2.8, and extending through Table 2.12, we look at differences in
performance between genders when there is a major change in the gender of mutual fund
management within a single mutual fund. For this analysis, we use the second sub-sample of
data. The data used for these tables includes only funds that have a major change in management
gender during the life of the fund or as far back as 20 years (March 1984), whichever is shorter.

For the analysis in Table 2.8, we use equations (1B) and (2B). Change12 is equal to one
during the period when there is a higher percentage of female managers. For this table, we
analyze the concluding 12-month period for previous management, skip a six-month window so
that new management can adjust the fund’s portfolio according to its preferred method of
investing, and analyze the following 12-month period for new management. These constraints
effectively reduce our sample size. Often, management changes rapidly enough that either
previous or post-management does not stay in place long enough to meet our criteria. As such,
there are 129 instances of a change in the gender of a manager either from male-to-female (79)
or female-to-male (50) among the 102 funds in our sample that meet our criteria for this table.
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Table 2.8 is split into three panels. The number of observations is listed for each model
because the Russell 1000 has less data than the other indexes, and therefore fewer observations.
Note that the fixed-effects p-values are mixed in this table. So, we perform SBIC test for pooled
and fixed effects. All of the SBIC results favor using the pooled regression. Further, none of the
fixed-effects results were materially different from the pooled regressions. So for ease of
comparison, we show only pooled regressions for all three panels. Panel A displays the results
from all 129 changes in management gender. Here we see that the CHANGE12, the variable
indicating whether or not a change in manager gender is significant, is negative, but not
significant in any of the equations. Also the abnormal return (alpha) is not significant in the
single index equations, but it is in the multi-factor equations. To see if there is a difference
depending upon whether the earlier or later management gender mix has a higher percentage of
female managers, we separate the data into male-to-female changes in management in Panel B,
and female-to-male changes in Panel C. Panel B shows the results of a change from a lower
percentage of female managers to a higher percentage of female managers (i.e. male-to-female).
In this regression, CHANGE12 is now positive, but again it is not significant, but the abnormal
return is now negative and significant in all equations. In Panel C, changes in management
gender from a higher percentage of female mangers to a lower percentage of female managers
(i.e. female-to-male) are shown. In this panel, the CHANGE12 variable is now significant (and
negative) in all equations, and the abnormal return is no longer significant. So, in interpreting the
12-month regressions, it appears that abnormal returns are significant only when management
changes from a lower percentage to a higher percentage of female managers, suggesting that, in
this case, all managers have significantly negative returns and there is no significant difference in
the gender of the manager. However, when management changes from a higher percentage to a
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Table 2.8. Dynamic Change in Manager Gender (12-Months Before and After)
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Table 2.8. (continued)
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Table 2.8. (continued)
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lower percentage of female managers, the gender of the manager is significant. In this case, the
female managers impact the returns of the fund negatively. This implies that the fund returns
become better after the new management is in place (since, in this case, the new management has
a lower percentage of females).

In Table 2.9, we perform the same exercise as in Table 2.8, but here we use 24 months of
data both before and after the six-month window to see if the results are consistent. For this
analysis, we again use equations (1B) and (2B). Change24 is equal to one during the period
when there is a higher percentage of female managers. The sample size is affected dramatically
due to the relatively rapid changes in management composition. There are 75 instances of a
change in the gender of a manager either from male-to-female (44) or female-to-male (31)
among the 102 funds in our sample that meet our criteria for this table. In Panel A, we show all
changes in management gender in the sample. The abnormal return is negative and significant in
all cases, whereas the CHANGE24 variable is positive in the single-index regressions and
negative in the multi-factor models, but insignificant in all cases. In Panel B, where we look at
changes from a lower percentage of female mangers to a higher percentage, the abnormal return
is negative and significant in all regressions. The CHANGE24 variable is positive and significant
in the one-index models, but becomes insignificant in the multi-factor models. When looking at
Panel C, the female-to-male changes, the abnormal return is significant only in the multi-factor
models, but the CHANGE24 variable is now negative and significant in all models. So, in the
24-month regressions, we have mostly similar results to the 12-month regressions. Alphas, when
significant, are always negative, the CHANGE24 variable is only consistently significant when
changing from a higher percentage of female mangers to a lower percentage (i.e. female-to-male
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Table 2.9. Dynamic Change in Manager Gender (24-Months Before and After)

108

Table 2.9. (continued)
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Table 2.9. (continued)
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shift in management). The only new result in this table is that there is some evidence that female
management has a positive influence on returns when management changes from a lower
percentage of female managers to a higher percentage (i.e. male-to-female shift in management).
If this is true, it indicates that former management is being replaced by better management,
regardless of gender. However, the evidence is not strong as the results are only significant in the
24-month, single-index regressions.

In Tables 2.10 and 2.11, we do a comparison of abnormal returns similar to the one
performed in Table 2.7. Here, we are analyzing both the 12-month (Table 2.10) and 24-month
(Table 2.11) returns from identical data used for Tables 2.8 and 2.9. As in Table 2.7, we run
separate pooled regressions on all fund returns being managed either by a female or a male in the
sample. Abnormal returns are then obtained and compared between genders using a seemingly
unrelated regressions (SUR) technique. The alphas from the regressions with a higher male
concentration in management are then subtracted from the alpha from the regressions that have a
higher concentration of female managers. If the results are significant and positive, we may
conclude that funds with a higher concentration of male managers outperform funds with a
higher concentration of female managers. Panels A, B and C are separated in a similar way to
those in Tables 2.8 and 2.9.

In Table 2.10, our sample consists of 129 instances of a change in the gender of a
manager either from male-to-female (79) or female-to-male (50) among the 102 funds in our
sample that meet our criteria for this table. In Panel A, we look at all major changes in
management gender. The abnormal returns are negative and significant for both higher and lower
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Table 2.10. Alpha Comparison for Change in Manager Gender (12 Months Before and After)
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Table 2.10. (continued)
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Table 2.10. (continued)
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percentages of female managers except for the lower percentage of female managers in the
single-index regressions where they are not significant. Further, the difference between the
alphas is significant and negative. This indicates that, in general, abnormal returns are negative.
But, when there is a higher percentage of females managing a fund, the abnormal return is
slightly, but significantly more negative. We get a much different picture when looking at Panel
B, though. In this panel, we are examining changes in gender from a lower percentage of female
managers to a higher percentage of female managers. Here the abnormal returns are mostly
negative and significant as well. However, the period with the higher percentage of female
managers has significantly higher (less negative) abnormal returns than the managers with a
lower percentage of females. This suggests that female managers contribute positively to a
fund’s returns if they are replacing male managers. When we examine Panel C, we see an
explanation for the results in Panel A. In Panel C, we are looking at changing the management
gender from a higher percentage of female managers to a lower percentage. The results for the
abnormal returns are negative and significant for the period with a higher percentage of female
managers, but insignificant for the period with the lower percentage of female managers. This
indicates, that when being replaced by male managers, female managers have a lower
performance record than the incoming manager(s). Interestingly, when taking the three panels
together, and looking at the comparison of differences in alpha, we can see that the differences in
Panel C are more negative than the positive results in Panel B (i.e. their absolute values are
greater). So, it looks as if the negative differences in Panel C are driving the significant results in
Panel A. So, the conclusion for Table 2.10 is that new management tends to have better
abnormal returns than former management. The results are slightly increased if new management
is changing from a higher female percentage to a lower female percentage (female management
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to male management). As stated earlier, in Table 2.11, we look at the same question as Table
2.10, but use 24 months of data before and after the six-month window rather than 12 months.
The sample includes 75 instances of a change in the gender of a manager either from male-tofemale (44) or female-to-male (31) among the 102 funds in our sample that meet our criteria for
this table. This is an identical sample to the one used for Table 2.9. For this analysis, we run
separate pooled regressions for female and male managers in the sample. Abnormal returns are
then obtained and compared between genders using a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR)
technique. For Panel B and Panel C, the qualitative results are exactly the same as for Table 2.10
(using 12 months of data before and after the six-month window). However, Panel A has one
interestingly different result from Table 2.10. For the single-index regressions, the difference
between the higher percentage of female managers and the lower percentage is positive and
significant. While not conclusive, it does suggest that the results are mixed as to whether a higher
percentage of female managers contributes positively or negatively to a fund’s returns.

Our next look at whether gender affects fund performance is illustrated in Table 2.12. For
this analysis, we looked at the same sample as in the previous analysis, the 102 funds that have
150 major changes in gender management, either from male to female or from female to male.
However, rather than look only at the manager tenures immediately before and after a change in
manager gender composition, we look at the entire time-series of each fund and assign a
percentage of female managers to each month of the fund’s existence or as far back as 20 years
(March 1984), whichever is less. As an example, this number is equal to 1 if the only managers
of a fund are female or 0.25 if there are four managers of a particular fund and one of them is
female. The variable picks up changes in gender composition of fund management for the entire
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Table 2.11. Alpha Comparison for Change in Manager Gender (24 Months Before and After)
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Table 2.11. (continued)
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Table 2.11. (continued)
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Table 2.12. Percentage Change in Management Gender Composition
Russell 1000
Factor
Est. Coeff.
Alpha
0.19785 ***

Factor
Alpha

SP500
Est. Coeff.
0.24161 ***

0.04175

FEMALE

-0.07954

0.03381

FEMALE

-0.09087

0.07148

RUS1000

0.90926 ***

Fama-French 3 Factors
Factor
Est. Coeff.
Alpha
0.05921 *
0.03062

FEMALE

0.06101

SP500

0.89482 ***

0.00679

Carhart 4 Factors
Factor
Est. Coeff.
Alpha
-0.00714

-0.12715 **

0.03195

FEMALE

0.05499

RMRF

0.00577

0.88380 ***

0.05490

RMRF

0.00535

SMB

0.16983 ***
-0.02276 ***

0.90442 ***
0.00607

SMB

0.00717

HML

-0.13198 **

0.18356 ***
0.00741

HML

0.00617

0.02238 **
0.00881

UMD

0.04696 ***
0.00656

Adjusted R-squared
Fixed Effects F-Test
Fixed Effects P-Value

0.6012
0.7271
0.9819

0.6035
0.8469
0.8640

0.6785
0.9874
0.5173

0.6795
0.9880
0.5155

Panel regressions were performed using all cases where there was at one time (since March 1984) a major change in management
gender composition, either from female to male or male to female. The following equations were tested:
J

rp ,t = α p + β p I t + γ p Female p ,t + ε p ,t and rp ,t = α p + ∑ β p ,i I i ,t + γ p Female p ,t + ε p ,t , where Female is equal to the percentage of
i =1

female managers managing a fund for a given month. All months of the fund for which data is available are included. So, the
following must hold for all months: 0 <= Female <= 1. A major change is defined as at least 50% of the managers of a fund at a
specific time must be female (male) and change to at least 50% male (female). The same manager composition must remain in control
of the fund for at least 12 months both before and after the date of change in gender composition. This resulted in a sample of 102
funds with a total of 150 gender composition changes. Standard errors are below coefficients. * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at
the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
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time-series for the past 20 years. We introduce a variable, FEMALE, into each of the factor
models to see if it is significant as shown in equations (1C) and (2C). The panel regression
technique is used. The fixed-effects R-squared is lower than the pooled regression R-squared
which causes the fixed-effects F-statistic to be insignificant, signifying the fixed-effects
regression is less efficient. Therefore we report the pooled regression findings.

The results show that in the single-index models, the percentage of female fund managers
is negative, but not significant. However, in the multi-factor models, the FEMALE variable is
both negative and significant. We believe the multi-factor models are likely better than the
single-index models for two reasons. First, the alpha (abnormal returns), which were significant
in the single-index models, are less significant in the three-factor model and not at all significant
in the four-factor model. From theory, one would expect this value to be insignificant if markets
are efficient. The other reason that the multi-factor models may be better is that they consistently
have higher adjusted R-squareds, indicating that these models can explain a higher percentage of
the excess returns in the funds. So, since all coefficients on the FEMALE variable are negative,
when interpreting the results presented in this table, the regressions suggest that an increase in
the percentage of female managers of a particular fund should produce a corresponding decrease
the excess returns of that fund.

So, from the analyses that examine whether differences exist in performance between
genders when there is a major change in the gender of mutual fund management within a single
mutual fund, we find some mixed evidence. It appears conclusive from Tables 2.8 – 2.11 that
when there is a major change in the gender composition of fund management, incoming
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management typically performs better than outgoing management. However, there is also some
evidence that suggests that new management performs better when changing from female-tomale management than when changing from male-to-female management. Also, results from
Table 2.12 suggest that the percentage of females managing a fund in inversely related to
performance. But this result does not hold for all regressions. So, our conclusion is that we have
uncovered some evidence that male managers outperform female managers over time, but the
evidence is not conclusive and needs further investigation.

Our final analysis looks at the question of what factors contribute to the abnormal excess
returns found in mutual funds, and whether these factors differ by gender. These regressions are
cross-sectional regressions based upon values on February 29, 2004. The abnormal excess
returns used are derived using heteroskedastic-consistent ordinary least squares regressions from
the single-index and multi-factor models. For this analysis all 2,217 funds are examined.

The results of the regressions in Table 2.13 show that all of the factors are significant in
more than one regression thereby being potentially important in determining abnormal returns.
But, only the expense ratio is significant in all four regressions. The dummy term for the
manager’s gender is insignificant in all regressions. Also, when the interaction terms are
considered for female managers, very few are significant. In fact, only when abnormal returns
are derived using the S&P 500 is as the proxy for the market are any of the interaction terms
significant. The other three equations have no significant differences between male and female
managers. So, although the results are mixed as to which specific factors are important in
determining abnormal returns, from these regressions, we can conclude that there is no
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Table 2.13. Determinants of Abnormal Return
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significant difference between male and female managers in the determinants of abnormal
returns.

6. Conclusion

Literature in recent years suggests that females are more conservative investors than
males. But fund managers typically have more investment education than the average person. So,
the question of whether or not female fund managers exhibit more conservative tendencies is an
interesting one. Along with this question, we explore whether or not the investment decisions of
female fund managers affect the performance of the funds that they manage in a different way
than do the investment decisions of male managers.

We find a few differences in the matched comparison that suggest that female managers
have a lower risk tolerance (standard deviation). Therefore, they spread their risk out over many
stocks and hold few assets in their top 10 holdings. Also, females manage no-load funds
significantly more than males in the value category.

In our analyses of current fund managers, when we look at the individual funds
separately, we find that there are no significant differences in performance of mutual funds due
to management gender. This is consistent with Atkinson et al. (2003) where they examine fixedincome funds. However, when female and male managers’ returns are pooled and compared with
each other, we find weak, but significant evidence that current female fund managers, when
analyzed as a group, show slightly lower performance than male managers.

124

We then analyze performance within funds over time. Here, the most consistent result is
that when changing the composition of fund management, regardless of gender, the new
management has significantly greater performance than prior management. Although not
conclusive, there is some evidence that one would receive a larger increase in performance if
investing in a fund that is reducing the percentage of its female management (i.e. increasing the
male percentage), although both increasing and decreasing the percentage of female managers
will result in better returns with new management.

We also find that the percentage of female managers managing a fund is negatively
related to the fund’s performance over time. Finally, we find that the determinants of abnormal
returns (e.g. expense ratio, net assets, etc.) cannot be attributed to the gender of the fund
managers.

From the results presented, one might be tempted to draw the conclusion that one should
avoid funds that are adding female managers (or reducing male managers) to their management
teams and prefer funds that are adding male managers (or reducing female managers) to their
management teams. This investment strategy should be cautioned against. The strongest results
we obtained were that new management performs better than old management when there is a
major change in the gender composition of the fund’s management. All results that suggest that
female managers might have lower performance than male managers also have some mixed
result that indicates that either the conclusion is not a strong one or that the opposite conclusion
may also be drawn. The one result in this category that does not have contradictory results is the
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percentage of female managers managing a fund is negatively related to the fund’s performance
over time. However, there are at least two possible explanations for this result that are not
explored here. As was noted earlier, except for the analysis using current managers, we used 20
years of data for our analyses. It may be possible that female managers were less qualified in the
earlier part of the period than more recently. Also, in an attempt to be politically correct, funds
may want to add female managers to their teams, regardless of whether there are male
counterparts who are more qualified for the same position. Either of these explanations would
suggest that funds might have added less qualified female managers to their teams to the
detriment of fund performance. We leave exploration of these possible explanations to future
research.
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